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ABSTRACT- .
 
Some theorists of what is called the hew rhetoric
 
cohtend thet classical rhetorid is no longer pertinent to
 
the modern world. In this thesis> contemporary rhetorical
 
perspectiyes, pa:rtiCularly that of thd new rhetoricf are ^
 
analyzed and a five-part description of a rhetoric that ?
 
reconciles the cdntemporary perspectives and the classical
 
traditiort is proposed—-that is, that rhetoric is dialogue,
 
that it addresses the whole person, that it is productive,
 
that it is metaphbrical, and that it is ethical. It is
 
maintained that the purported estrangement between our
 
rhetbric and that of Our traditions is more specious than
 
real/that the classical tradition is still relevant to a
 
contemporary rhetoric that is humanistically conceived.
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- Introduction
 
In our modern age, it is said, we cannot communicate
 
effectively or meaningfully because we no longer share
 
common beliefs and world views, because for us knowledge is
 
uncertain and always changing, and because values are
 
situational and relative. Our world, unlike that of other
 
peoples in other times, is vexed by confusion and our
 
universe is essentially meaningless. Language itself, our
 
uniquely human ability to discover and convey meaning, to
 
shape our lives individually and socially, is no less a
 
victim of this confusion, if not a participant in and cause
 
of it. Little wonder, therefore, that rhetoric, the ancient
 
and inclusive art with which we facilitate and enlighten the
 
conduct of the individual and society, should also be
 
comprised or rendered impotent, or, as if seizing the
 
moment, made into something exploitive and opportunistic.
 
Once used to negotiate the difficulties inherent to our
 
existence, to discover and consolidate shared meanings,
 
beliefs, and aspirations, rhetoric now too often merely
 
reflects our confusion or acts helpless in the face of
 
difficulties, as though it too had traded in the arts of
 
living for the expediencies of existence.
 
In examining what he calls the "pathos of modern
 
communication," Winston Weathers writes, "Man cannot
 
communicatev we are told, because of the very nature of the
 
universe and reality and our own limited intellectual
 
capacity" (7). And in the same place he observes that for
 
many people "modern science has opened the doors that reveal
 
a meaningless and indescribable universe."^ Daniel Fogerty
 
states that a new philosophy of rhetoric is needed in a
 
"time of disintegration like the present" (130), And in the
 
same vein, but partially subscribing to the world view that
 
Weathers criticizes and Fogerty seems to accede to, S.
 
Michael Halloran writes, "Deprived of a given world, the
 
modern author is likewise deprived of a given rhetoric. To
 
the extent that he must articulate his own world in such a
 
way that his readers can enter it with him, he must likewise
 
invent the commonplaces that are the rhetorical lineaments
 
of that world" ("On the Eng of Rhetoric" 630), The
 
rhetorician, Halloran tells us later in the same article, is
 
the "lonely modern anti-hero" (631).
 
Commonplaces are not invented, of course, not as
 
Halloran uses the word "invented"; if they were, they
 
wouldn't be commonplaces. But that we are able to live with
 
such contradictions, to regard them as normal, in indicative
 
of the problem. Commonplaces, those mutually held beliefs
 
and assumptions of people that form the ground of classical
 
rhetoric, are discovered, summoned forth by the rhetorician,
 
and used to bring about the sort of Social consensus
 
necessary as premises for arriving at probable truths. That
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was true for the Greeks and, as I will maintain here, it is
 
still true. Rhetoricians, just the opposite of the
 
solipsistic anti-hero, modern or otherwise, are necessarily
 
persons invested in the course and well-being of society,
 
persons who share its fundamental principles and goals, and
 
in the best of circumstances persons who somehow personify
 
them—who by voicing themselves voice their culture.
 
S. Michael Halloran acknowledges that aspect of
 
rhetoric and, ironically, demonstrates it himself; for in
 
the same place that he gives us the discouraging news that
 
the rhetorician must articulate his or her own world view
 
and invent commonplaces in order to communicate, he seeks
 
our understanding, our agreement, that communication, and
 
therefore rhetoric, is both possible and important. He
 
reaches out to us with language and ideas, and not just his
 
ideas but those of our cultural tradition. He thereby
 
confirms, unwittingly perhaps, the observation of Wayne
 
Booth, who wrote that "to worry about the reader would be
 
absurd in a genuinely absurd universe" (The Rhetoric of
 
Fiction, 394). By caring about his readers and presuming a
 
communality of meaning with them, S. Michael Halloran is the
 
antagonist of his own "lonely modern anti-hero."
 
The word "modern" and its train of assumptions
 
notwithstanding, our world is not so much different from
 
that of other times, not in regard to the essentials of the
 
human condition, which constitute, after all, the subject.
 
venue, and rationale of rhetoric. Our world is not
 
different because we are not different. The basic problems
 
and opportunities of humanity—its glvens—-the tasks of
 
living, individually and communally, the possibilities for
 
good and evil, and our ability to choose between them, are
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no different now than they have ever been. And if our
 
rhetoric, or what passes for it, is not up to meeting those
 
problems, for whatever reason, then it is up to us to make
 
or retrieve a rhetoric responsive to the needs of our age.
 
None of us has been "given" a world. Each generation is
 
responsible for maintaining whatever beneficial patrimony is
 
available to it, and responsible as well for discovering or
 
reviving meanings and values that are good for the
 
individual and conducive to the comity of peoples.
 
The problem for rhetoric is not one of meanings and
 
values. We are not bereft of either; and humanity is always
 
inclined, courageously or haltingly, in the direction of
 
both; this is contrary to those who would have us resigned
 
to the confusions and contradictions of the contemporary
 
world, those who forget that rhetoric's task is to face up
 
to uncertainty and wrest meaning from it, to be defiant when
 
need be and to seek the good always. Nor is the problem one
 
of language. To most people, words still mean what they
 
say. Besides, a language sufficient to corrupt—and we have
 
seen more than enough of that—is a language to ennoble, A
 
viable, humanistic rhetoric depends, rather, on that basic
 
human sentiment, that disposition towards the good and the
 
meaningful, that we have all been born with. What Richard
 
Weaver calls "the life-affirming sentiment" (Ideas Have
 
Consequences 20) is the heart of rhetoric, and it is always
 
there with people, actually or potentially, and no
 
preachments or world views to the contrary can extinguish
 
it. And it is to that sentiment, which is belief, of the
 
individual and as it is conjoined communally, that rhetoric
 
makes its first appeal, and upon which all its endeavors,
 
whether argumentative or persuasive, are based.
 
So long as that sentiment is intact, rhetoric functions
 
as it always has. It presumes, as it much, that life makes
 
sense, that the universe is not meaningless; and it presumes
 
that persons have the freedom to choose, that neither the
 
person nor history is determined. It starts not with the
 
universe, given or otherwise, but with the individual, who
 
is always passionate as to the outcome of his or her
 
existence and ever needful of a meaningful world. These
 
truths have been the leitmotif and premise of all rhetoric,
 
including the rhetoric of our own day. And it is especially
 
so with the rhetoric of those who would deny these truths.
 
No one seeks meaning more earnestly or is more credulous,
 
more given to lesser faiths, than the person who professes
 
to find the universe meaningless,
 
"The soul is impulse, not simply cognition," Richard
 
Weaver writes, "and finally one's interest in rhetoric
 
depends on how much poignancy one finds in existence"
 
(Ethics 23). And Ernesto Grassi writes, "As a passionate,
 
and not exclusively rational, being, man is in need of the
 
emotive word" (Rhetoric as Philosophy 26). If we are having
 
trouble finding poignancy in existence, much of the blame
 
can be laid to a rhetoric that appeals to us partially—and
 
therefore, in a sense, not at all—by basing its appeal on a
 
would-be pure reason. Caught up in and infatuated with the
 
scientific point of view, contemporary rhetoric often seems
 
unable to find any grounds for truth beyond the inductive
 
and empirical. As science unpeels the endless onion skins
 
of earth and sky and deludes itself and us into thinking
 
that it is getting somewhere, our rhetoric, and all who are
 
suitors to it, notably the academic world, has had an almost
 
exclusive resort to facts. We have witnessed the futile
 
tragi-comedy of the humanities, of which rhetoric is both
 
child and parent, being put in hock to scientism, and then,
 
thereby emasculated, attempt to address the massive human
 
problems of the contemporary world. In this we are not new.
 
But never have the ethics of science and the humanities been
 
so closely intertwined as in our own day, and never,
 
therefore, has rhetoric been so dehumanized. Ernesto
 
Grassi, to whom I will return later at length, scores this
 
phenomenon in Rhetoric as Philosophy, as does Winston
 
Weathers in The Broken word. Susan Miller, who also holds
 
to the humanist banner, can write as follows:
 
It takes little philosophical training to recognize
 
... that rhetorical huinanism, the view that unites
 
language, thought, and action in the person, lost
 
out to seif-reflective rationalism, the separation
 
of subject from object. The contextuality of
 
rhetoric could not hold sway against objective,
 
scientific, and ultimately positivistic thought.
 
(50)
 
And Robert Connors, no less an advocate of rhetorical
 
humanism than Grassi. Weathers, and Miller, can write; "We
 
should not in our search for provable knowledge forget that
 
the essential use of all knowledge is in aiding humanity in
 
search for consensually-arrived-at truth" ("Composition
 
Studies and Science" 19). Richard Weaver> without
 
equivocation as usual, goes straight to the heart of the
 
problem when he writes.
 
Like MacBeth, Western Man made an evil decision,
 
which has become the efficient and final cause of
 
other decisions. Have we forgotten our encounter
 
with the witches on the heath? It occurred late in
 
the fourteenth century, and what the witches said to
 
the protagonist of this drama was that man could
 
realize himself more fully if he would abandon his
 
belief in the existence of transcendentals.
 
(Ideas 2-3)
 
Our age's near obsession with the inductive, scientific
 
point of view is based, it would seem, on the supposition
 
that humanity can somehow lift itself up by its own rational
 
bootstraps. And coincident with that, as Albert Camus once
 
observed critically, is the implicit notion that society is
 
its own end. So far as weaver is correct, to the extent
 
that we have turned our backs on transcendentals, we have
 
turned our backs on any hierarchy pf values necessary to the
 
formulation of a meaningful and reasonable rhetoric, one
 
anchored somewhere. Without a hierarchy, without ultimate
 
terms, rhetoric is unable to really evaluate, predicate, or
 
define, and becomes instead a situational response to
 
shifting circumstances. Even sbitie of those who harken to
 
the richness of our rhetorical traditions overlook the
 
scheme of ultimates upon which rhetoric depended and imagine
 
that its forms are transposable to a world leery of value
 
judgements and dissociated from transcendent verities. And
 
in this respect, those who criticize the unthinking
 
imitation of classical rhetoric's forms are correct.
 
Scientism~and I borrow the word from Robert Connors to
 
indicate an aberration of what true science stands for—with
 
its relegation of inquiry to the observable, not only cuts
 
us off from the sustenance of our humanistic tradition by
 
rejecting that tradition's transcendent suppositions, but it
 
offers us as well a truncated definition of humanity,
 
providing as the subject of rhetoric the non-historical,
 
materialistic, self-bound person (not the "lonely modern
 
anti-hero, which is a fictive creation for the most part,
 
and a romantic one at that). Given the dominance of
 
scientism and its attendant world view, it's something of a
 
wonder that rhetoric survives at all, except as a curiosity
 
or a mere technique--a way of using tropes, figures, and the
 
rest of the incidental paraphenalia of classical rhetoric.
 
 Rhetoric survives, nonetheless, because we survive.
 
And even a would-be self-sufficient age finds itself faced
 
with human problems that don't yield to purely rational
 
resolution and human aspirations that aren't fulfilled by
 
society. Human nature can be told that there is no truth
 
beyond what can be observed and proven, but it never really
 
believes it. And it can be told, as Marxism has been
 
telling it boorishly for a long time, that what it sees is
 
what it gets, but it doesn't believe that either. It knows
 
intuitively that there's no such thing as merely mortal, and
 
at heart it resents being told otherwise. Take from it one
 
hierarchy and it will construct another; deny it one
 
"metaphysical dream" (Weaver, Ideas 20) and it will conjure
 
another one.
 
A meaningful rhetoric is always possible. It does not,
 
as Whitman and others have maintairied, depend on a pre­
■ . ■ ' -4 ■ 
existing great audience. Given the antagonisms and
 
spiritual disintegrations of our age, if we wait for just
 
the right audience^ it will be a long wait. The audience is
 
always there, just as it has always been. But to discover
 
it, rhetoric will have to discover itself, and it will have
 
to be conceived of in a way commensurate with its tasks.
 
Instead of searching for the right audience, or straining to
 
find a ground on which one can be appealed to, it will have
 
to gather the wit and courage to overcome its own
 
agnosticisms and risk the same choices, the same affective
 
commitments, that have constituted the challenges of all
 
great rhetoric from the beginning. People like Milton,
 
Swift, and Zola didn't wait for the right audience; they
 
forged one, and in the process didn't quail at going into
 
the teeth of prevailing opinion—which, as often as not, is
 
prevailing bigotry.
 
The so-called new rhetoric (and there are echoes of the
 
word "modern" here, as if by new is meant that we have
 
reached a higher plateau of enlightenment) sets itself apart
 
from the classical tradition and supposes that we have
 
achieved a better way of understanding-—that, as Daniel
 
Fogerty writes, "our decision-making process has largely
 
changed to a mutual, cooperative discussion that strives for
 
rational compromise" (132). Fogerty's flush of optimism
 
came in 1959; and on the basis of the theories of Kenneth
 
Burke, I.A. Richards, and certain semanticistsr principally
 
S.I. Hayakawa, he envisioned an enlightened age of rhetoric
 
just around the corner. Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede,
 
writing much later and keeping their feet more firmly on the
 
ground, dismiss most of the contentions of the new rhetoric
 
and argue for the continuing relevance of classical theory.
 
In their essay "On Distinctions Between Classical and Modern
 
Rhetoric" they write; "Earlier in this essay we alluded to
 
the large body of rhetorical 'theory' which argues that
 
modern rhetoric is characterized by understanding, mutual
 
sharing, and two-way communication. Yet how well does such
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a theory account for or describe twentieth-century
 
rhetorical practice, which has surely reached new heights
 
(or depths) of manipulative use of language" (48)? Lunsford
 
and Ede observe the obvious, yet the obvious hasn't seemed
 
to have had much impact on those who still operate according
 
to the notion that rhetoric can function and function
 
effectively in lieu of objective standards and commonly held
 
beliefs. As if striving to accomodate a senseless universe,
 
many contemporary theorists despoil the very rhetoric they
 
would uphold by resigning it, with scrupulous avoidance of
 
value judgements, to the manipulation of language, the
 
shuffling of ideas, and the situational negotiation of
 
mercurial circumstances.
 
My purpose here is to try to provide a description of
 
rhetoric that will reconcile the estrangement between our
 
rhetoric and that of our classical traditions. I will
 
maintain that if the consensus and hierarchy of values
 
available to traditional rhetoric have declined or been
 
mislaid, then it is our task to build or find new ones. I
 
will try to show that rhetoric at its best, whether
 
classical or contemporary, has common elements, that its
 
appeal, its persuasiveness, and its justifications come from
 
its ability and willingness to address the full person
 
sincerely involved with his or her individual destiny and
 
social existence. I will propose that it does so by
 
eliciting universal and essentially unchanging human values.
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From my perspective, the issue is not our ability, or lack
 
of it, to decipher the universe. "Life is a mystery to be
 
lived," Thomas Merton once wrote, "not a problem to be
 
solved." The issue, rather, is humankind's ongoing
 
challenge to find what Richard Weaver calls "poignancy in
 
existence," a challenge, I am convinced, shared no less by
 
the ancients than by us. In brief, I will propose a
 
description of rhetoric that I hope will be pertinent to the
 
contemporary experience and compatible with the classical
 
tradition. In doing that, I will necessarily have to
 
circumvent many aspects of rhetoric as it is now broadly
 
conceptualized. I will attend instead only to rhetoric of
 
broad import, to public rhetoric, that is, to language
 
addressed to the community of persons on the occasion of
 
communal problems.
 
First I will look at some of the current and past
 
definitions and conceptualizations of rhetoric, this to
 
better understand the scope and difficulty of the problem.
 
As well, this will underscore and clarify my own rationale
 
for attempting, however imperfectly, a description of
 
rhetoric that is comprehensive enough to embrace both
 
traditional and contemporary rhetorical theory.
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Chapter II
 
Some Definitions of Rhetoric
 
Given the proliferation of definitions, perspectives,
 
and theories that mark the discussion of contemporary
 
rhetoric, it is difficult to clearly grasp just what
 
rhetoric entails. 'In his well-known article "The Rhetorical
 
Stance," Wayne Booth gives us some idea of the problem:
 
The word "rhetoric" is one of those catch—all terms
 
that can easily raise trouble when our backs are
 
turned. As it regains a popularity it once seemed
 
permanently to have lost, its meanings seem to range
 
all the way from "the whole art of writing on any
 
subject," as in Kenneth Burke's The Rhetoric of
 
Religion, through the "special arts of persuasion,"
 
on down to fairly narrow notions about rhetorical
 
fignres and devices. And, of Course, we still have
 
the meaning of "empty bombast," as in the phrase
 
"merely rhetorical." (139)
 
Actually, Wayne Booth understates the case.
 
Extrapolating from the multitude of definitions available oh
 
the subject, it would be possible to conceive of rhetoric as
 
virtually anything that has to do with language, and a few
 
things that specifically don't. Consider a definition by W.
 
Ross Winterowd, for example, in Contemporary Rhetoric: A
 
Conceptual Background. "According to my definition,
 
rhetoric is the global art that develops theories
 
concerning, and studies the manifestation of, all human
 
discourse, not just persuasion" (20). According to that
 
definition, one is not so pressed to discover what rhetoric
 
is as to what it isn't. Winterowd—wisely, one feels—goes
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on to say, "I will not defend that definition, nor will I
 
elaborate upon it." To elaborate would be to write a book
 
about everything. And speaking about everything, consider
 
Kenneth Burke's definition as quoted above by Wayne Booth;
 
Rhetoric is "the whole art of writing on any subject." That
 
covers everything from the Sumitta Theologica to thank-you
 
notes to one's grandmbther. A conclusion we can't avoid at
 
least entertaining is that if rhetoric is everything then
 
rhetoric is nothing. A definition should never be too tight
 
or too literal, but if it doesn't have some specificity its
 
meaning tends to dissipate.
 
Moving somewhat this global, Edward P. J. Corbett, in a
 
book about rhetoric widely regarded as authoritative.
 
Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, defines rhetoric
 
as "the art of discipline that deals with the use of
 
discourse, either spoken or written, to inform or persuade
 
or move an audience, whether that audience is made up of a
 
single person or a group of persons" (3). That is still
 
broad, and it is faulty, I think, for defining a rhetoric
 
without any ethical dimensions; so according to Corbett's
 
definition there would be nothing, aside from eloquence, to
 
distinguish the rhetoric of Abraham Lincoln and Adolph
 
Hitler, of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Reverend Jim
 
Jones. But at least Corbett confines rhetoric's meaning to
 
the "use of discourse," even though in his definition he
 
doesn't take into account non-verbal discourse—^pictures.
 
14
 
gestures, music, and so on. Yet his definition is
 
graspable: it delineates, however loosely—and a good
 
definition must be spacious—a province for rhetoric that is
 
understandable. More than that, his definition ties in with
 
rhetoric as classically conceived. It is an art or
 
discipline, it concerns discourse, and it concerns
 
particularly that discourse used to persuade, instruct, or
 
move an audience.
 
The word audience is key here. It implies that
 
rhetoric is addressed to people in their social stance on
 
particular occasions or in response to public situations.
 
That lifts rhetoric from the realm of the commonplace.
 
Corbett's definition suggests, quite intentionally, the best
 
known definition of rhetoric we have, that of Aristotle, who
 
defined rhetoric as "the faculty of discovering the
 
available means of persuasion in any given situation." And
 
Corbett makes sure to point out—as many writers who quote
 
Aristotle's definition don't, thus missing the point—that
 
the Greek word for persuasion comes from the Greek word to
 
"believe." Therefore, Corbett writes, "one sees that
 
Aristotle's definition can be made to comprehend not only
 
those modes of discourse which are 'argumentative' but also
 
those expository modes of discourse which seek to wind
 
acceptance of information or explanation" (2-3).
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I will return to Corbett later on when I attempt to
 
provide my own description of rhetoric; but first let's look
 
at some definitions of rhetoric from other sources.
 
In his article "Modern Rhetorical Theory and Its Future
 
Directions," C.H. Knoblauch writes: "I will assert as
 
boldly as I dare that rhetoric is the process of using
 
language to organize experience and communicate it to
 
others. It is also the study of how people use language to
 
organize and communicate experience" (29; italics his).
 
Knoblauch makes defining rhetoric sound like a pretty risky
 
business. And his definition is notable in that, like some
 
Other moderns, he moves rhetoric interior to the person,
 
making of it a process of not only how we communicate with
 
others but also how we communicate with ourselves—in other
 
words, how we think. We see in his definition currents of
 
contemporary epistemological thepry.
 
In the same article, Mr. Knoblauch refers to another
 
definition of rhetoric, that of Douglas Ehningerr when he
 
writes, "Perhaps Douglas Ehninger has best defined rhetoric
 
from this modern intellectual vantage point when he refers
 
to it as 'that discipline which studies all of the ways in
 
which men may influence each other's thinking and behavior
 
through the strategic use of hymbols" (37). This "modern
 
intellectual vantage point" refers to the perspective—the
 
epistemic theory-—that sees the person as, in Ernst
 
Cassirer's phrase/ a symbol-using animal, as using symbols
 
16
 
 to conistruct meaning and reality. More accurately, symbols
 
in this sense are reality. "Knowledge of the world,"
 
Knoblauch writes, "is an imaginative achievement comprised
 
of symbols" (36). Knoblauch doesn't prove this epistemic
 
theory that is premise to his and Ehniriger's definition of
 
rhetoric; rather he summons as authorities for it such
 
people as Cassirer, Whitehead, de Sausure, Sapir, Levi-

Strauss, Langer, and Polyani, but fails to note that they
 
didn't prove it either. In any case, having defined the
 
individual as the maker of knowledge, symbolically or any
 
other way, Knoblauch's and Ehninger's rhetoric tends to
 
devolve to the subjective formulation and manipulation of
 
that knowledge. How one thusly isolated subject with his or
 
her proprietary knowledge communicates with another isolated
 
subject with his or her proprietary knowledge is a question
 
left unanswered. Symbols without common reality seemingly
 
communicate on the wing.
 
Compare the definitions of Knoblauch and Ehninger,
 
representative as they are of a prevalent, although not
 
exclusive, modern epistemic perspective, with that of a
 
nineteenth-century rhetorician, Henry Day (as quoted by Nan
 
Johnson in "Three Nineteenth-Century Rhetoricians: The
 
Humanist Alternative to Rhetoric as Skills Management"):
 
The art of rhetoric proposes to explain the
 
principles by which we discourse or communicate
 
; thought and feeling to other minds, and to furnish
 
the means of acquiring a skill and dexterity in the
 
use of this power.
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That is a clear definition and one that would be
 
understood by the average person. But notice the different
 
epistemic premise: "The art of rhetoric proposes to explain
 
principles by which we discourse or communicate thought and
 
feelings to other minds . ,. No ethereal meeting of
 
winged symbols here, just persons talking to one another.
 
To his credit, Mr, Day didn't take the trouble to cite
 
contemporary authorities to prove that persons are able to
 
talk with one another. And notice also the humanistic
 
perspective, as opposed to those conceptions of rhetoric
 
based on an epistemic theory that has the individual as an
 
isolated generator of meaning, a symbol-making animal who is
 
unable to mutually discover and experience meaning in
 
concert with objective reality and other persons.
 
Moving back to the present, here's a pragmatic,
 
functional definition of rhetoric by James Kinneavy:
 
I mean by rhetoric the kind of discourse that is
 
exemplified by political speeches, legal persuasion
 
in court, religious sermons, commercial advertising,
 
etc, I do not include in rhetoric most scientific
 
writing, fictitious or poetic writing, or even
 
informative news stories. In other words, I limit
 
'rhetoric' to the meaning it had in the trilogy of
 
the traditional liberal arts of grammar
 
(literature), rhetoric, and logic. This delineation
 
gives at least some historical realism to the
 
definition, ("Restoring the Humanities: The Return
 
of Rhetoric from Exile" 19)
 
There is some confusion with that definition in that he
 
excludes fiction and poetry at the same time that he
 
includes literature; and I'm not sure how commercial
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advertising sneaked into the trilogy of the traditional
 
liberal arts. But generally that is a definition we can get
 
our teeth into, as opposed, for example, to the rhetoric-is­
everything definition of Kenneth Burke ("the whole art of
 
writing on any subject"). In addition, by limiting rhetoric
 
to its more traditional forms, Kinneavy doesn't suppose that
 
modern rhetoric is different in kind from what it has been
 
historically. And he keeps rhetoric in the humanistic arena
 
by excluding scientific or merely informative writing.
 
Anyone familiar with the writings of Einstein, however,
 
could argue quite persuasively that scientific writing is
 
sometimes eminently humanistic.
 
Finally, here is a definition from the previously
 
quoted Daniel FOgerty, S, J,, in which he seeks to combine
 
the theories of Kenneth Burke, 1, A, Richards, and S, I,
 
Hayakawa, Rhetoric, he writes, is "the science of
 
recognizing the range of meanings and the functions of
 
words, and the art of using and interpreting them in
 
accordance with this recognition" (130), That could be
 
stated more simply by saying that rhetoric is being able to
 
use and understand language. Worth mentioning about
 
Fogerty's definition is that it makes of rhetoric both a
 
science and an art, thus reflecting the modern scientific
 
study of language. In the same book (Roots for a New
 
Rhetoric), Father Fogerty proposes that college curricula be
 
revamped to reflect the work of Burke, Richards, and the
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modern study of semantics, especially the work of S. I.
 
Hayakawa. He saw those theorists as providing a rhetoric
 
for the next decade, which in this instance was the 1960*s.
 
In the 1960's we did indeed witness a new kind of rhetoric,
 
but it is doubtful that Burke, Richards, and Hayakawa—
 
especially Hayakawa—approved of most of it.
 
There are, of course, many other definitions of
 
rhetoric from many different perspectives, but the above
 
sampling provides some idea of the complexity and
 
contrariness of the problem. Some definitions see rhetoric
 
as necessarily ethical—a subject I will discuss below—and
 
in that respect maintain a continuity with classical theory
 
and practice, as well as keeping rhetoric in a humanistic
 
mode, unless one can conceive of a non-humanistic ethics.
 
Every definition of rhetoric I have seen shows evidence of
 
people struggling, of scholars and others trying to pin down
 
just what rhetoric is. Some of the efforts are better than
 
others; but none yields the kind of clarity and
 
inclusiveness we like in our definitions. My efforts to
 
provide a description of rhetoric that is compatible with
 
the classical tradition and pertinent t the contemporary
 
experience won't be any different—will be no less a
 
struggle with no fewer loose ends. Perhaps that is
 
unavoidable. Even when conceptually delimited, rhetoric is,
 
as Aristotle noted, the most embracing of the arts, "the
 
power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any
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subject presented to us." Remembering that persuasion means
 
bringing about belief, that covers a lot of ground. The
 
following descriptive qualities of rhetoric should,
 
therefore, be inclusive enough and flexible enough to
 
pertain to "any subject presented to us" during the working
 
out of our social existence.
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Chapter III
 
Rhetoric is Dialogic
 
That rhetoric should be dialogic seems a simple enough
 
assertion, perhaps even self-evident. All communication,
 
after all, presumes the existence of an audience, someone
 
communicated with. But true dialogue, and within that true
 
dialectic, presumes an active participation by the audience,
 
a sharing in the act of communication. Much of what passes
 
for rhetoric lacks this mutuality, as communication is often
 
monologic--the audience is not talked with but rather talked
 
to or at. Thence would much contemporary communication and
 
composition theory have us size up, evaluate, and
 
demographically measure our audience pursuant to
 
successfully putting across a message to it. This is the
 
monologism of advertising, politics, and special-interest
 
advocacy—rhetoric that accommodates, or rhetoric that
 
manipulates, which is, large or small, a rhetoric of power.
 
Monologic rhetoric demeans the audience by keeping it
 
passive and disallowing it participation in discourse. In
 
effect, therefore, it denies members of the audience their
 
full humanness.
 
Douglas Ehninger makes the striking point that
 
argument, which is necessarily dialogic, "compliments" our
 
humanity by appealing to our unique rationality, that to
 
appeal to an audience's sentiment or to solicit its
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agreement without using that appeal as the basis of
 
argumentation or dialectic is to treat people as means^ as
 
things (6-7). Richard Weaver addresses the same issue when
 
he writes, "Whereas formerly its (rhetoric's) burden was
 
what people believed or had experienced, the burden now
 
tends to be what they wish to hear" (iliMs^ 184). Telling
 
an audience "what they wish to hear" is rhetoric that caters
 
to or patronizes the audience. Monologic rhetoric finds
 
support in those theories that define rhetoric in terms of
 
the aims and purposes of the rhetorician; and it is
 
exemplified by those phenomenological perspectives that see
 
the writer or speaker articulating an essentially subjective
 
or isolated interpretation of reality, one disengaged from
 
the reader or listener. And it is characteristic of all
 
those forms of communication that merely impart information.
 
Dialogic rhetoric, on the other hand, "compliments" the
 
audience by bringing it into and making it part of the
 
rhetorical act. It makes the audience a dynamic participant
 
in the seeking of probable truth, making truth consensual in
 
the sense that it is mutually discovered and acceded to. At
 
the same time, it takes the risk of disagreeing with the
 
audience's preconceptions or opinions. Rhetoric doesn't
 
always tell people what they want to hear, but rather risks
 
confounding their expectations in order to find the truth.
 
John Gage, in "An Adequate Epistemology for Composition:
 
Classical and Modern Perspectives," states the issue well:
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 Rhetoric is dialectical, or like dialectic, insofar
 
as it assumes an active audience which motivates the
 
composer's inquiry into possible knowledge, rather
 
than a passive audience to which prior knowledge is
 
meant to be passed on. Modern composition methods,
 
as well as ancient ones, do not neglect to advise
 
the writers that they must "know their audience,"
 
but the difference I am suggesting is not
 
necessarily a difference between knowing one's
 
audience and not knowing it. It is a difference
 
between how and at what stage that knowledge is used
 
to inform the composing act. In contemporary
 
composition, knowing one's audience is usually
 
viewed as a rhetorical consideration in the sense
 
that one must adapt one's way of making a case to
 
the "needs, interests, personality, values" of a
 
particular audience, but not in the sense that a
 
particular audience contributes reasons which
 
determine the case must be or motivate the
 
inquiry, (162f italics his)
 
The audience should not be an obstacle or receptacle.
 
Gage argues, but rather a resource. Otherwise, one is
 
engaged in a "pseudo-dialectic, predetermined to guarantee
 
that the writer's reasons prevail" (163), In the same
 
place, drawing on Aristotle, he says, "Classical invention
 
...was not carried out for the purpose of 'finding
 
something to say,' but for the purpose of investigating
 
reasons that might be applied to the solution of a given
 
problem" (158). Seen this way, rhetoric enters us into a
 
dialogue before we even begin to write or speak. The
 
dialogue is on-going and informs our choices and solutions,
 
not to win over the audience but to participate with them,
 
to discover, in Gage's words, "mutually validated reasons in
 
the context of the need to discover collective truths"
 
(164), Rather than treating the audience as a "thing"
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(Ehninger) or as a "receptacle" (Gage), this is a humanistic
 
rhetoric that treats the members of the audience as co-

rhetoricians.
 
Consider the similarity of Gage's contention to that of
 
Chaim Perelman in a different context, where he seeks to
 
establish valid grounds for argumentation:
 
To make his discourse effective, a speaker must
 
adapt to his audience. What constitutes this
 
adaptation, which is a specific requisite for
 
argumentation? It amounts essentially to this: the
 
speaker can choose as his points of departure only
 
the theses accepted by those he addresses, (The
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Whichever the perspective, the point is the same, whether in
 
classical or contemporary rhetoric: the search for probable
 
truths as rhetorically transacted is a cooperative venture.
 
In classical rhetoric, that cooperation was contained
 
in the concept of the enthymeme, which was not just a
 
syllogism with the premise left off—a syllogistic short
 
cut—but an argument based on commonplace beliefs (Gage
 
157), Such commonplaces were the rhetorical capital of the
 
classical orator, and his or her appeal to them was both a
 
confirmation of shared beliefs with the audience and a
 
confirmation of the fact that such shared beliefs with the
 
audience and a confirmation of the fact that such shared
 
beliefs were accessible—urgent enough to be persuasive when
 
summoned forth. The distinction is important because it is
 
in the latter respect, in regard to how urgent our beliefs
 
are, that some contemporary rhetorical theory parts company
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with the classical tradition. An inability to discover and
 
embrace shared meanings wpuld render the concept
 
enthymeme void. The problem—that is, that the enthymeme or
 
its equivalent is no longer possible--is suggested by S.
 
Michael Hallotan^s remark quoted earlierrtha^^ we have been
 
deprived of a given rhetoric because we have been deprived
 
of a given world. It is endemic to that epistemic view gf
 
some moderns that would have ell knowledge in a constant
 
state of creatioh, negotiation, and process. And it forms
 
a backdrop as well for the work of Ghaim Perelman (and
 
others), who has devoted much of his efforts to search for
 
what he calls "warrantable" grounds for argumentation, which
 
is to say that if we can't prove our premises, we can't
 
. validly argue. ■ 
Because the audience of classical rhetoric was able to
 
grant a broad range of premises, the rhetorician was able to
 
pursue arguments with more leeway. Richard Weaver can thus
 
refer to the "spaciousness" of the old rhetoric, a
 
spaciousness permitted by an audience that was able to bring
 
to the rhetorical experience a body of shared principles and
 
beliefs. That the range of those shared principles and
 
beliefs has narrowed in our age is clear enough; but, I
 
would argue, the rhetorical appeal is still basically the
 
same. Its basis is still shared meanings and commonplace
 
beliefs.^ Rhetoric either takes commonplace beliefs as a
 
starting point and builds on them or, no less dialogic, it
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musters cooperation in search of them, knowing that if in
 
our social and political deliberations we are going to find
 
workable solutions to our problems, we will have to start
 
someplace. Indeed, knowing that we have tp start someplace
 
in order to get things done i^ a commonplace belief. One of
 
the ironies of monologic communication is that it seeks to
 
impose truths unilaterally, thus promulgating prescriptions
 
at the same time that it denies shared truths. The larger
 
irony is that by denying our ability to share meaning with
 
any kind of reasonable constancy> it abrogates its own
 
ability to communicate. Monologic rhetoric in this sense is
 
not the result of the absence of shared truths or knowledge,
 
it is the cause for their seeming disappearance. The pathos
 
of communication that Winston Weathers refers to, mentioned
 
in my introduction, is a misnomer: it's the pathos of
 
noncommunication.
 
Looking for a way out of the apparent dilemma of
 
seeking probable truths without premises on which to base
 
them, Thomas Farrell purports to reformulate what he calls
 
"Aristotle's early expansive vision," that is, that
 
"rhetoric was the art which employed the common knowledge of
 
a particular audience to inform and guide reasoned judgement
 
about matters of public interest" (1). After recounting how
 
knowledge has changed over the centuries and about how the
 
modern person doesn't have the certainties at hand that were
 
available to the Greeks, Farrell pursues a current
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definition of shared knowledge upon which we can base our
 
rhetorical appeals. He delineates the problem well:
 
Aristotle was able to posit a body of ggmition
 
knowledge as a natural corollary to his ideation of
 
human nature, the potential of human reason, and the
 
norms and procedures of public decision-making.
 
While analytic and dialectic provided foundation and
 
structure for the facts of science and the general
 
truths of philosophy, rhetorical method found its
 
warrant in occasions of particular choice, its form
 
the enthymeme and example, and its substance in
 
shared, contingent knowledge, consisting in signs,
 
probabilities, and examples. (2)
 
Recognizing that our commonplace beliefs and collective
 
world views are not similar to those of the Greeks, Farrell
 
looks for a communality with which we can reach agreements.
 
He finds this in what he calls "social knowledge," which he
 
defines as follows; "Social knowledge comprises conceptions
 
of symbolic relationships among problems, persons,
 
interests, and actions, which imply (when accepted) certain
 
notions of preferable public behavior" (4), Farrell is
 
chary of the word "belief," and he is, I think, equivocal
 
when he uses phrases like "symbolic relationships," "which
 
imply," and "certain nbtions." Phrases like these have a
 
way of vaporizing. Later on, as if to cover himself
 
further, he employs Stephen Toulmin's phrase "as a rule" to
 
refer to those norms by which social conduct can be
 
regulated. That phrase too is rather fast on its feet. Yet
 
Farrell recognizes that in bringing rhetoric to bear on
 
social problems, we have to start somewhere and we have to
 
do something.8 Moreover, his language implicitly recognizes
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that dialogue deals with things in time and space, with
 
reality.
 
In arguing for social knowledge as he defines and
 
illustrates it, Farrell also acknowledges rhetoric as an
 
essentially cooperative endeavor between writer or speaker
 
and the audience. He writes:
 
I maintain that social knowledge rests upon a
 
peculiar kind of consensus. That is to say, it
 
rests upon a consensus which is attributed to an
 
audience rather that concretely shared. This means
 
that such knowledge does not rest upon agreement
 
which is both fact and known to be fact. The
 
assumption of agreement may be counterfactual, Some
 
persons may, in fact, disagree with what is
 
attributed. Yet it is assumed understanding of
 
agreement—as an hypothesis rather than fact-—which
 
makes rhetorical argument possible, (5)
 
In the same place he writes, "But more than being simply
 
attributed to others, social knowledge is assumed to be
 
shared by other persons in their collective capacity as
 
audience" (8), He then says, "A conscious and civilized
 
audience is therefore representatiye in more than a
 
statistical senses for we must assume that its collective
 
nerve endings are alive to the interests of others in
 
society" (8), And he adds, "One Should not forget that the
 
rhetor speaks sn behalf of others. That knowledge which is
 
assumed to be held by other persons thus involves the rhetor
 
with the complicity of other knowers. whose interests are
 
now a factor for reasoned consideration" (13), The
 
similarity between that comment and the comments of Gage and
 
Perelman quoted above is striking.
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Thomas Farrell makes of consensual discovery something
 
a bit more mysterious than I would prefer. And like Chaim
 
Perelman speaking about the mental construct of the
 
"universal audience" r he is
 
reluctant to say that uhiversal principles exist and can be
 
appealed to. He can write, for example, that "Sopial .
 
knowledge is thus the assumption of a wider consciousness"
 
(and, he suggests, one greater than the individual
 
consciousness)> providing us with a phrase that hae a
 
certain philosophic^ ring to it but one that, if subscribed
 
to, would entail a bigger leap of faith than the realist
 
epistemolpgy he takes pains to aVold. Still, in searching
 
for a way out of the epistemic desd-snd of our age, h©
 
reinyests the audience of rhetoric with their rightful share
 
of participation in the social discovery of probable and
 
workable truths. Given his epistemic uncertainties—he
 
predicates audience in terms of "collective nerve endings,"
 
after all—Thomas Farrell does us a service.
 
But compare his conception of rhetoric as dialogue to
 
that of a nineteenth-century traditionalist, Franz Theremin,
 
someone representative of the classical point of view (and
 
virtual unknown in contemporary rhetorical theory). The
 
following quotation is from Nan Johnson's article "Three
 
Nineteenth-Century Rhetoricians: The Humanist Alternative
 
to Rhetoric as Skills Management" and refers to Theremin's
 
book .
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The invention of argumentative discourse is
 
dependent upon what Theremin calls the dialogic
 
quality of rhetoric. The rhetorician must be
 
committed to the principle of discovering shared
 
truths, truths that will in turn generate the most
 
effective means of expression and fulfill his or her
 
purpose. Theremin describes the rhetorical dialogue
 
as "an attempt to transfer something that has been
 
generated in the depths of the soul into another
 
person, which can be done only in proportion as the
 
orator himself possesses that which is to be
 
reproduced. (108)
 
Note the difference in phraseology from that of Thomas
 
Farrell: "depths of the soul," "into another person" (not
 
"collective nerve endings). There's no equivocation with
 
Theremin, no vapory terms or trendy abstractions like "the
 
assumption of a wider consciousness." (Of course, there
 
will always be those who would argue that the word "soul" is
 
about as vapory as one can get.) Based on principles and
 
seeking discoverable, shared truths, one person communicates
 
with another person and, like Socrates in the Ehaedj:ii^,
 
journeys with that sympathetic other toward the truth.
 
As I will maintain in the next section, that other
 
person must be a whole person, one whose identity and
 
integrity remain intact even as he or she is part of a mass
 
audience. The individual can never be collectively
 
subsumed. For rhetoric as dialogue is inseparable from its
 
other aspects; the integrity of the members of its
 
audience, its language, its occasion, and the ethical
 
principles that inform and elicit it. By the same token,
 
hone of the other aspects of rhetoric can thrive if rhetoric
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is not dialogic. And, I will argue, these things are true
 
in our age no less than they were in Theremin's or
 
Aristotle'Si
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chapter IV
 
Rhetoric Addresses the Whole Person
 
A valid rhetoric addresses the whole person in his or
 
her fully human capacity and in contemplation of his or her
 
responsible social membership. It iSf therefore, inclusive
 
and humanistic, addressing us in terms of our common
 
humanity at least and in terms of our shared dignity at
 
best. Increasingly, however, the communication of the
 
contemporary world is aimed at the person partially
 
considered^—at his or her race, sex, ethnicity, political
 
partisanship, occupation, or special interest.
 
Increasingly, therefore, the communication of the modern
 
world is exclusionary. Rhetoric compliments human nature by
 
recognizing and addressing its wholeness; and its appeal is
 
inclusive.
 
I don't propose to examine the whole range of the
 
exploitation of language and the demeaning of the person
 
that results from it. I have chosen instead to focus on
 
certain instances of contemporary anti-rhetoric (I borrow
 
the term from Robert Connors) that have often escaped
 
critical scrutiny, or even gained respectability, instances
 
where not the whole person but the partial person is
 
addressed and intentionally so. My primary concern will be
 
certain language or discourse phenomena characteristic of
 
scientism and the academic community.
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A currently fashipn concept among many academics in
 
rhetoric and composition studies is that of the discourse
 
community. Its foots are variedf but it stems mostly from
 
the concept of the speech community generated by the study
 
of linguistics. In linguistics, the concept is sound
 
enough, concerning as it does those ways and patterns of
 
speaking that members of particular, definable groups use to
 
communicate. A speech commuriity coalesces linguistiGally
 
around certain cpresumptions, shared meanings, a unique
 
dialect perhaps, and some common, perceptible values that
 
somehow set that group apart from other people. The trouble
 
starts when the speech-community concept is transposed from
 
spoken language to written discourse.
 
The literature and points of view are extensive here,
 
but representative of them is the perspective of David
 
Bartholomae. In two articles especially—"Released into
 
Language: Errors, Expectations, and the Legacy of Mina
 
Shaughnessy" and "Inventing the University"—Bartholomae
 
tri®s to make the case that the academic discourse
 
community, as simile to a linguistic speech community,
 
creates and maintains a mode of discourse unique to it. To
 
anyone familiar with academia, that is an unarguable
 
supposition. But Bartholomae goes on from there and
 
maintains that that is the way it ought to be, that that
 
represents and allows for an enhanced communicative
 
capability. He contends, for example, that new college
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students—persons unversed in the academic community's
 
unique discourse style and lexicon—should be indoctrinated
 
into this way of communication: that they should unlearn
 
their nonacademic style of writing and adapt to, adopt, the
 
style of academic in general and their chosen field of study
 
in particular. Once a student enters college, Bartholomae
 
contends, what is important is that the student learn to be
 
understood by—be linguistically negotiable with—his or her
 
fellow academics, and particularly his or her fellow
 
sociologists or biologists or what have you. The student
 
should, in Bartholomae's disturbing phrase, acquire the
 
"gestures of academic authority" ("Inventing the
 
University," 161). If this perspective were simply a rehash
 
of when-in-Rome advice to the student who wants to get
 
along, then it would be relatively harmless, although still
 
anti-rhetorical in its exclusivity. But it is more than
 
that. As it is formulated by Bartholomae, it entails a much
 
broader conceptualization. The discourse community—in the
 
instant case the academic discourse community--constitutes,
 
or creates, or makes possible (the language is vague) a
 
grasp of knowledge and a generation of meaning that would
 
not be available without its existence. Put another way,
 
one duly initiated into the discourse of the academic
 
community has access to ideas and knowledge not available to
 
the average person. If that sounds a bit elitist it is
 
because it is a bit elitist. Consider another phrase by
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Bartholomae. "It should be clear by now, " he writes, "that
 
when I think of 'knowledge' I think of it situated in a
 
particular discourse community, rather than as situated in
 
mental 'knowledge sites'" ("Inventing the University," 145).
 
The sounds of modern epistemic theory, as alluded to
 
earlier, are discernible in that statement/ and the
 
inference is available that knowledge is a social construct,
 
all the better constructed if that society is made up of
 
experts collegially and linguistically joined by a definable
 
and necessarily, exclusive body of data, presumptions,
 
codes, and so on. The clear implication is that knowledge
 
resides in or is proprietary to particular academic
 
communities, and that if one want access to that knowledge
 
he must join that community, and on its terms. Knowledge
 
here, and therefore communication, is intramural, not
 
available generally to the person but prescriptively to the
 
specialist. The discourse community as conceived by
 
Bartholomae can remain intact only so long as it remains
 
anti-rhetorical.
 
The notion of the academic discourse community—or of
 
the business discourse community or the scientific discourse
 
community—is anti-rhetorical because it addresses the
 
person only insofar as the person partakes of the identity
 
of the community and because it excludes those not in that
 
community. (It's worth noting that the speech discourse
 
community is anti-rhetorical for some of the same reasons.)
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Yet the discourse coimnunity is anti-rhetorical for other
 
reasons as well. It deals almost entirely in scientific or
 
specialized or semantically pure language, thereby leaving
 
much of the person unaddressed (see chapter below, "Rhetoric
 
uses Metaphorical Language"), And, ironically, it leaves
 
its own members unaddressed and circumscribes or rations
 
their intellectual activity. Richard Freed and Glenn
 
Broadhead refer to the problem in their article "Discourse
 
Communities, Sacred Texts, and Institutional Norms,"
 
confounding themselves slightly by using jargon (of which
 
the word "paradigm" is now the paradigm) favored by the
 
communities they criticize:
 
For both overtly and tacitly, these communities
 
establish paradigms that discoursers adhere to or,
 
often at their risk, depart from ,.. . The
 
paradigms reign: they set an agenda and attempt to
 
guarantee its meeting, often rewarding those who do
 
and discouraging those who don't. They legislate
 
conduct and behavior, establishing the eminently
 
kosher as well as the unseemly or untoward, (156)
 
From this viewpoint, the discourse community, by
 
establishing what to talk about and how to talk about it,
 
intellectually impoverishes its members at the same time
 
that it is erecting linguistic and ideational barriers, and
 
sometimes valuative ones, between itself and the community
 
at large. As various discourse communities, like medieval
 
city-states, set themselves apart, members of those
 
communities are denied whole communication, as thinking,
 
language, and intellectual agenda are prescribed. And if we
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take into account the current fascination of some persons in
 
the language-arts disciplines with the speculations of
 
Thomas Kuhn, particularly his hypothesis in regard to
 
paradigms and "paradigm shifts, the situation is further
 
exacerbated. For is, as Kuhn maintains about the physical
 
sciences and as some would find applicable to other
 
disciplines as well, such as rhetoric and composition
 
studies, academic communities cluster research, ideation,
 
and experimental axioms according to ^  Pi:ior:i conceptual
 
models, then not only would ideas and language be
 
circumscribed, they would be virtually dictated.
 
In any situation where one's response to problems,
 
especially human problems, is predetermined, whether by
 
rubrics of language or ideas, and whenever the person is
 
addressed not as a person but as a member or a specialist or
 
an expert, then rhetoric ceases. Phrases like "discourse
 
community" and "paradigm shift" are merely indicators of the
 
problem. Yet they are especially worth mentioning because
 
they are, in the main, the issue of scholars, some of the
 
very people who should sustain a valid rhetoric. As Richard
 
Hughes observes in "The Contemporaneity of Classical
 
Rhetoric," where he argues for the judgement and discretion
 
found in the best of classical rhetoric, "Never before has
 
judgement-making been in such jeopardy; we are hemmed in by
 
the specialists who deal in arcane fact and speak only to
 
one another, and the taste-makers who eschew evidence and
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capitalize on bur unreason. Butr unless we continue to make
 
and share judgeinents> we are in danger of creating a vast
 
society of silence" (p. 159).
 
The person and sbciety are both deprived when
 
communication is segregated into cubicles, where it caters
 
to or indoctrinates its own and ignores or patronizes all
 
others, sterilizing or hoarding knowledge in the name of
 
knowledge and sometimes pronouncing social policy in the
 
name of expertise. In rhetoric, which concerns the social
 
life of the whole person and is based on "discovered
 
judgement" (Hughes, p. 158), there's no such thing as
 
expertise, and the concept of the discourse community is a
 
glaring aberration. "The symbol of rhetoric," Ross
 
Winterowd reminds us, "is the open hand, beckoning to
 
understanding" (Rhetoric; & Synthe^l^, 85). The language
 
of the scholar, the scientist, and the "expert" is becoming
 
increasingly "closed-handed." The pedant's stance, Wayne
 
Booth writes, "consists of ignoring or underplaying the
 
personal relationship of speaker and audience and depending
 
entirely on statements about a subject—that is, the notion
 
of a job to be done for a particular audience is left out"
 
("The Rhetorical Stance," 184). The person is not addressed
 
but advised, not complimented but patronized. And the
 
person is told, as often as not, that in matters that affect
 
his or her life, that he or she should accede to the
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specialist. What's particularly distressing about this kind
 
of a,ni:i-^humanisin is that it has become So respectable.
 
If members of specialized communities merely spoke to
 
one another, as Richard Hughes notes, we could live with
 
that. The rhetorical irony is, however, that the more
 
specialized a person becomes in our age, the more likely it
 
is he will be called on—or feel the call himself—to
 
pronounce on matters of social importance, to propagate
 
social judgements. Disturbingly, such persons are listened
 
to, indeed, often sought out, as the contemporary audience
 
seems willing to abdicate its own responsibility in the
 
rhetorical dialogue and hand over the deliberation of
 
important matters to society's would-be experts. Thus, for
 
example, in recent memory can a renowned anthropologist
 
pronounce judgement on birth-control policy, a renowned
 
nuclear physicist tell us what to do about nuclear
 
disarmament, a renowned heart surgeon advise us on racial
 
policy, and a renowned pediatrician tell us how to raise our
 
children. We are awash in the anti-rhetoric of expertise.
 
Rhetoric addresses the whole person, and in that act,
 
by that full recognition, it invites the person, open-

handedly, into the rhetoric itself. Since it seeks probable
 
truths in regard to matters of social policy in which we all
 
have a stake, it makes of the audience an expert. It can't
 
do this if it addresses the audience in its particularities
 
of interests, knowledge, occupation, race, sex, or
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ethnicity. Accordingly, it must be couched in language
 
considetate of, and thereby complimentary to, fhe whole
 
person, recognizing that we are not just rational, althQug^^
 
rational we ought be, but also emotional and value-seeking.
 
Thus the classical trivium of logos, e^^ and pathos, and
 
the recognition by Aristotle and others that rhetoric must
 
touch the whole person because it is the whole persbn who
 
will be called on to believe^ and act according to it. In
 
this respect, Lunsford and Ede quote Grimaldi's commentary
 
on Aristotle:
 
In rhetorical discourse the audience must be brought
 
not only to knowledge of the subject but knowledge
 
as relevant and significant for they are either
 
indifferent, opposed, or in partial agreement . . .
 
If the whole person acts then it is the whole
 
person to whom discourse in rhetoric must be
 
directed ("On Distinctions Between Classical and
 
Modern Rhetoric,"43—from Grimaldi's r 146­
We see in that an observation similar to Wayne Booth's
 
as quoted above, an observation confirmed more broadly by
 
Chaim Perelman, whose studies of rhetoric led him to the
 
conclusion that rhetoric has never been exclusively logical
 
or dialectical but has always, at its best, used the full
 
range of language to appeal to the whole person. An
 
obvious corollary is that the rhetorician must employ his;
 
whole person—logos, ethos, and pathos—in making his or her
 
rhetorical appeal. A purely rational or a purely emotional
 
person will unavoidably create an anti-rhetorical appeal.
 
The fault of such notions as the discourse community is that
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they falsely suppose that reason or data or scholarship
 
alone will do the trick. That supposition has, like bad
 
genes, disabled would-be academic rhetoric all along and
 
accounts largely for both its social impotence and its
 
persistent tedioushess.
 
Scholars like Perelman frame rhetoric in correctly
 
humanistic terms and therefore realistic terms. Rhetoric
 
doesn't seek to convince an audience, Perelman notes, but
 
strives rather for its "adherence,"a much more congenial
 
term. And, he recognizes, rhetoric must have "presence,"
 
that it must be marshalled and scored in such a way as to
 
rouse the sympathy of the audience. There is something here
 
of Kenneth Burke's theory of dramatistics, that rhetoric is
 
not just reasonable discourse but also must be plotted for
 
audience impact. And, of course, it has been the stock-in­
trade wisdom of the entertainment business from day one (a
 
business to which the Greeks, especially Aristotle, were no
 
strangers). Perelman's "presence" and Burke's
 
"dramatistics" are just alternative ways of recognizing what
 
those in the rhetoric of show business have known since the
 
time of Homer, that whatever the message, the audience must
 
be won over. And the only way to do that, the only way to
 
win the audience's adherence, is to treat them as people.
 
Define them partially and win them not at all. Belief and
 
action, the goals of rhetoric, flow from the whole person.
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as Aristotle observed, so it is the whole person who must be
 
spoken to.
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Chapter/V'-':::-';: ■ 
Rhetoric is Productive 
Productive is not exactly the right word, but we hhve
 
no right word for it. The word "standing" as used in
 
jurisprudence comes close. A case must have standing for a
 
court to^^ c there must be sgmething at stake, a
 
pressing issue to be resolved. Conversely, the issue Can't
 
be merely moot or speculative, iusi as the lau^V ideally,
 
responds to real issues, rhetoric is responsive t6--nbt the
 
creator of--actual, here-and-now, pressing social problems,
 
ones that demand solution, or at least a workable
 
resolutipn. The Gteeh^ t that contained the idea of
 
productiveness was stasis, although it meant not quite the
 
same thing. As did Lunsford and Ede, William Gage quotes
 
from William Grimaldi's Studies in the Philosophy of
 
Aristotle's Rhetoric and observes that rhetoric functions
 
"as a method of communication .. . between people as they
 
seek to determine truth or fallacy in real situations" ("An
 
Adequate Epistemolology for Composition: Classical and
 
Modern Perspectives," 155). The issue addressed by the
 
rhetorician is, as it were, a given. The rhetorician, and
 
the rhetoric, responds to it. Thus, Gage points out, the
 
modern concept of invention or discovery is often misused or
 
misconstrued as the means to find topics to write or talk
 
about. This would be the invention of a moot rhetoric. The
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rhetorician/ ratiher, use^ invention to explore the
 
categories and issues entailed in a pressing social
 
question. To return briefly to my analogy above, the lawyer
 
pleading a case does not invent precedents or points of law,
 
he or she finds, discovers, precedents and points of law
 
that are applicable to the case at hand.
 
In this same sense, the classical concept of the
 
enthymeme, as I discussed above in regard to rhetoric being
 
dialogic, is often misconstrued in contemporary rhetorical
 
theory, defined simplistically on the one had as a syllogism
 
with its primary premise missing and on the other hand as a
 
device of the rhetorician for unilaterally formulating a
 
problem or argument that he wants to convince the audience
 
of. As Gage points out, again indebted to Grimaldi, the
 
enthymeme was a way of getting into a subject that demanded
 
resolution (158), By analyzing the issue, the rhetorician
 
could discover premises endemic to it, premises shared by
 
the audience, and base his or her appeal on them—taking
 
them for granted, in effect, but using them both as
 
assumptions on which to base subsequent deliberation and as
 
a way to explicate the problem under consideration. Thus
 
could Perelman say, as I quoted earlier, that "the speaker
 
can choose as his points of departure only the thesis
 
accepted by. those;ii;hei./addresses;,;".;''; .
 
The subject, or thesis, of rhetoric, therefore, is not
 
presented to the audience but asked for by them, this
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element of rhetoric~its productive aspect, that it be in
 
response to real situations—-is frequently overlooked in
 
contemporary writings. Even the estimable Edward P. J.
 
Corbett, in his definition of rhetoric quoted earlier,
 
leaves it out. it's woj^th repeating that definition:
 
Rhetoric is the art or the discipline that deals
 
with the use of discoufse, either spoken or written,
 
to inform or persuade or move an audience, whether
 
that audience is made up of a single person or a
 
group of persons. (Classical RhetQclc_for_tb-e-Mo^ei:a
 
Afeadsnif 3).
 
That rhetoric should be productive in response to
 
pressing issues is not even implied, in that definition or
 
in most of the other definitiohs I quoted in that part of
 
this paper titled "Some Definitions of Rhetoric," It seems
 
to have dropped by the wayside; and one contemporary
 
theorist, Richard Vatz> can even maintain that rhetoric is
 
as the rhetorician says it is, that the rhetoric itself
 
virtually, or literally, creates the rhetorical situation
 
("The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation"). But let's look
 
again at Aristotle's definition of rhetoric, this time with
 
my underlines:
 
Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of obsefvihg
 
in any given case the available means of persuasion.
 
Every other art can instruct or persuade about its
 
own particular subject matter . . . But rhetoric we
 
look upon as the power of observing the means of
 
persuasion on almost any subject presented us.
 
In line with Aristotle's conception of rhetoric as being
 
responsive to real issues, consider the following comments
 
by Wayne Booth in his essay "The Rhetorical Stance":
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What makes the rhetoric of Milton and Burke and
 
Churchill great is that each presents us with the
 
spectacle of a man passionately invdlved in thinking
 
33 impsiJtsni iMsuali in iijs ssajpauy pf an
 
(188)
 
And in the same place he says in regard to Edmund Burke:
 
In short, because he was a man engaged with 2133 13
 
ihP effort to solve a human problem, one could never
 
call what he wrote dull, however difficult or
 
abstruse,\"
 
The emphases in Booth's quotation are mine; and the
 
words emphasized underscore the issue here: "passionately
 
involved," "thinking hn important question through in the
 
company of an audience," "engaged with men in the effort to
 
solve human problems." That is rhetoric of dialogue, of
 
mutuality, and of moment—not abstract, moot, or
 
speculative—and it is consequently rhetoric that engages
 
us. What Booth discovers in the rhetoric of Milton, Burke,
 
and Churchill could be discovered as well in all rhetoric we
 
generally regard as great. It is rhetoric of the person
 
stepping into the midst of an urgent social dialogue and
 
eloquently "thinking an important question through in the
 
company of an audience,"remembering that eloquence, like
 
form, follows function.
 
For another contemporary perspective consistent with
 
the classical, humanistic perspective, consider Ernesto
 
Grassi's comment in Rhetoric as Philosophy: "An abstract
 
subject will never lead to political action, but only that
 
subject which is 'found* in the concrete historical c" (51),
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I will draw on Mr. Grassi more extensively in my discussion
 
below of rhetoric and metaphorical language, but I will
 
quote him once more here. This is also from BhsiSXlS 35
 
The pressing nature and meaning of every qqestion
 
and answer, its concrete character, which is the
 
root of the human world, is excluded from every
 
formalistic approach to language. But it is only in
 
this concrete context that truth and error, inquiry
 
and knowledge, receive their meaning, (86)
 
How different the perspectives of Gage, Booth, and
 
Grassi--all of them consistent with the perspective of
 
Aristotle--are from those contemporary perspectives that
 
would invent subjects, analyze audiences demographically for
 
the sake of better convincing them of something^ or pick
 
subjects out of an idealogical hat for the sake of
 
monologically propagating them. Minus real problems that
 
demand resolution, misconstruing the function of the
 
enthymeme, aberrating the concept of invention, and
 
rendering the audience as passive recipients for the
 
rhetorician's ideas, much contempptary rhetoric and
 
rhetorical theory would demean the audience by imposing
 
solutions on it, or would use it as a sounding board for
 
speculative, formalistic, or specialized discourse. And to
 
the extent that one subscribed to the subjective,
 
phenomenological epistemology I referred to earlier, one
 
would not think "important questions through in the company
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of an audience," but would think them through in the Gompahy
 
of oneself/and, I suspect, rather dispassionately at that.
 
The rhetorician/ allowing for the redundancy/ is
 
rhetorically represehtative:of his society. If he is no
 
Ibnger an embodiinent of his culture, possessing the quality
 
the Greeks called arete, he nonetheless deals, in Grassi's
 
words, "in the context of tasks that arise 'here and now'"
 
(92), It is when the rhetorician retreats from or is aloof
 
from the concrete and urgent that such modern concerns as
 
pluralism, factionalism, and a lack of consensus come most
 
strongly into play. Social urgency, whatever the varieties
 
of world views and beliefs extant in society, is always
 
ground for a realizable, practicable consensus where none
 
was thought to exist. It was not that long ago when \
 
Franklin Roosevelt rhetorically welded a consensus out of
 
disparate constituencies, and not once but twice: first in
 
the face of economic urgency and then in response to
 
military emergency. More recently, Mar Luther King, Jr,
 
discovered a broad-based consensus of values where none was
 
thought to exist. Consensus there will always be. The
 
mistake comes from supposing that the rhetorician has to set
 
out with them in hand instead of by his passionate
 
involvement in real situations uncovering them in concert
 
with the audience as he goes.
 
There is a huge; difference, however, in rhetorical
 
appeals responsive to pressing social problems and that form
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of anti-rhetoric that exploits circumstances. We should
 
keep in mind that the demagogue too steps into urgent social
 
situations. But he does so with the desired outcome already
 
decided by him ahead of time; and instead of welding or
 
discovering consensus, he manipulates baser passions. The
 
appeal, then, is not to belief in order to work out
 
consensual resolution^; it is to prejudice for the purpose
 
of reaching his or her solution. The difference, in this
 
instance as elsewhere, is ultimately ethical--the motivation
 
of the rhetorician. Contemporary rhetoric, or the obverse
 
of rhetoric, is rife with examples of urgent social
 
questions being exploited opportunistically. And often the
 
only apparent difference between true rhetoric and false is
 
the difference between and ethical and an unethical
 
rhetorician, something no different now, as Plato reminds us
 
in the Phaedrus, than in classical Greece. But besides the
 
ethical character of the rhetorician, which is Sometimes
 
difficult to discern, a visible sign of exploitive or
 
demagogic rhetoric is that is seeks somehow to make its
 
audience exclusive. And false rhetoric is most often
 
characterized not by what it is fox but by what it is
 
against. Its sought—and frequently achieved~purpose is
 
therefore pervefsei Rather than seeking "liaison," in Chaim
 
Perelman's fine choice of words, it seeks social conspiracy.
 
False rhetoric is, however subtly, usually framed in terms
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of us versus them. The audience is not consulted, it is
 
taken in.
 
Erring on the other side, formalistic or academic or
 
strictly speculative rhetoric, by proffering solutions where
 
hone have been called for—and characterized therefore by
 
its importunance—and doing so in language that stirs no
 
oiie, can and usually does discover that it has no consensus
 
to work with. Sometimes the line between the exclusivity of
 
the demagogue and the elitism of the academic or
 
intellectual is thin indeed; but mostly formalistic rhetoric
 
is known—almost famous for—its inherent futility. Whether
 
in show business or rhetoricr there is nothing worse than
 
playing to an empty house.
 
Rhetoric has standing. And it has standing because
 
society, not the rhetorican says so. Yet sometimes that
 
standing, the "moment" of an issue, is given life by the
 
rhetorician. Just as rhetoric can discover and coalesce
 
consensus, it also can, as it has often done, shape and
 
focus an issue that was theretofore inchoate or latent in
 
the minds of the audience. In this capacity/ the
 
14
 
rhetorician breathes life into an issue. But here also
 
the opportunity for evil is close by the opportunity for
 
good. The paranoia, megalomania, and hate aroused in the
 
German society of the 1930's was in large part rhetorically
 
created, even though that rhetoric was demonstrably false
 
and archetypal of anti-rhetoric. Nonetheless, the lesson is
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there, as, incidentally, is the reminder that education, as
 
is popularly supposed, is not of itself a defense against
 
rhetorical abuse. The Germany of the 1930's-was the most
 
educated society in the world at that time. Although I
 
anticipate myself, since I deal with the ethics of rhetoric
 
below, the experiences of recent history should remind us
 
forcefully that any conceptualization of rhetoric that
 
leaves out its ethical component is fatally flawed. So when
 
I maintain that rhetoric is productive, it must be
 
underscored that that necessarily means that it be
 
productive for the good of the person and society, that in
 
the midst Of social urgency it seek a virtuous solution. In
 
that broad area between fact and opinion in which rhetoric
 
functions, the choice between good and evil is always in the
 
balance. Drgency, therefore, is not enough; the good
 
rhetorician must be able to predicate and define, and be
 
able to presume of his or her audience that same ability.
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Chapter VI
 
Rhetoric is Metaphorical
 
"As a passionate, and not exclusively rational being,"
 
Ernesto Grassi writes in Rhetoric as Philosophy, "man is in
 
need of t^^e sniotive word" (26). Rhetoric uses the emotive
 
word. Its language is metaphorical as opposed to logical,
 
figurative as opposed to literal. Rhetoric is borne by
 
living language, where form and content are inseparable,
 
language that communicates in concrete, historical
 
circumstances in regard to truths that are not logically or
 
inductively demonstrable. It both precedes and is
 
subsequent to the rational language of dialectic,
 
metaphorically:vitalizing premises that are prior to what
 
can be rationally established and, once a position has been
 
secured dialectically, leading us analogically to the whys
 
and wherefores of our actions. Rhetorical language
 
convinces us not only what We should do in a given social
 
circumstance but conveys as well the reasons for doing it.
 
It taps our basic convictions and prompts uS to make them
 
pertinent to the problems of living.
 
The fundamental Recognition here is that we as human
 
beings have a grasp of life and our place in the world that
 
is precedent to logical demonstration, a grasp that yields
 
the unstated premises: of any dialectic. We seek a just
 
solution to this or that social problem, for example.
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because we have a prior idea of justiGe; and we seek a just
 
solution for the good of the individual and society because
 
we have a precedent, priinal grasp of the good. And that
 
grasp is itself, according to Grassi, the product of
 
metaphor, of our internal fhetoric. Rhetoric, therefore,
 
both enables and addresses our idea of ju and of the
 
good. Neither can be proven or described in purely rational
 
terms. They precede induction, being first causes of it,
 
and Supersede logical conclusions, which are necessarily
 
■ evaluative, 
In regard to both values and beliefs, the motivating
 
stuff of individual and social action, we make them real,
 
actualize them, in relation to here-and-now concrete
 
circumstances by the use of figurative language, language
 
that draws meaning from arid gives meaning to the actual
 
content and context of pur lives. Rhetorical language is
 
able to transpose vital human values and beliefs to real-

life problems by metaphorically investing us in those
 
problems. In Rhetoric as RhilosoDhv r Grassi states the case
 
The techne of rhetoric, as the art of persuasion, of
 
forming belief, structures the emotive framework
 
which Creates the tension within which words,
 
questions that are dealt with, and actions that are
 
discussed, acquire their passionate significance.
 
It creates a tension through which the audience is
 
literally "sucked into" the framework designed by
 
the author, (26)
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To Grassi, rhetorie is not just an adjunct or
 
conveyance of philosophy, it is rather philosophy itself,
 
since metaphorically it discovers and vitalizes those
 
premises of value and belief upon which philosophy is based,
 
the premises from which it proceeds, which Grassi calls
 
archai, or archaic ideas. These are those basal human
 
conceptualizatipns tiiat represent humanity's sense of self
 
and the world and which stir its upward longing. (These
 
ideas cannot even be discussed without the use of metaphor.)
 
Rhetoric, Grassi, observes, "is the origin and criterion of
 
the movement of the rational process of clarification" (20).
 
It is, in other words, the language of wisdom; and by
 
barkening us to first things—by showing them, not proving
 
them—it is prophetic and evangelic; and it is, therefore,
 
in the deepest sense of the word, humanistic.
 
Rhetoric to Grassi "bridges" from archaic ideas, human
 
wisdom, to the world, and, just as importantr allows us to
 
go in the other direction alsb, metaphorically using the
 
acutal to shape and crystalize belief. In this, he recalls
 
and seeks to revitalize the Greek and Judeo-Christian
 
humanist tradition by making the world metaphor to the life
 
of the person and the course of society simile to the
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destiny of the individual. And in the process he seeks to
 
rescue rhetoric, and language generally, from coritemporary
 
rationalism and its separation of fact and belief, res and
 
verba, form and content. Rational language to Grassi is
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unrhetorical because it is divorced from actual
 
circumstances, from the present and pressing nature of life
 
and action. It is denotive, monologic, and information-

bound. In this respect, as Grassi notes, its code is fixed
 
and unable to adapt to the real circumstances of life;
 
whereas metaphorical language can invent its own code
 
according to circumstances. Grassi writes:
 
The pressing nature and meaning of every question
 
and answer, its Concrete character, which is the
 
root of the human world, is excluded from every
 
formalistic approach to language. But it is only in
 
the concrete context that truth and error, inquiry
 
and knowledge, receive their meaning. (86)
 
He repeatedly uses the words "pressing" and "urgent" to
 
emphasize his contention that rhetoric is the language that
 
cohabits with life, that allows for the adaptation of wisdom
 
and ingenuity to the vagaries and presence of
 
contemporaneous living, and does so in fully human terms,
 
conjoining logos and pathos, the person and society in the
 
same utterance.
 
Another contemporary, Richard Weaver, also sees
 
rhetoric as metaphorical. Where Grassi can write that "man
 
is in need of the emotive word," Weaver can write, "The soul
 
is impulse, not simply cognition; and finally one's interest
 
in rhetoric depends on how much poignancy one senses in
 
existence" (The Ethics of Rhetoric, 23). Only Weaver's :
 
perspective is from a different direction. Whereas Grassi
 
sees rhetoric at the root of our deliberations and
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preparatory for dialectic, establishing or discovering those
 
premises without which dialectic could not begin, Wea^ver
 
sees rhetoric as grounded in dialectic, taking up where
 
dialectic leaves off. He puts it this way;
 
What a successful dialectic secures for any position
 
therefore is not actuality but possibility; and what
 
rhetoric thereafter accomplishes is to take any
 
dialectically secured position and show its
 
relationship to the world of prudential conduct.
 
This is tantamount to saying that what the
 
specifically rhetorical plea asks of us is belief,
 
which is preliminary to action, (ShS-EiMsJ-Sf
 
.,Bhs:fcS:EiSf 28)
 
So just as Grass! sees dialectic as incapable of
 
getting at and conveying--hctualizihg--what he calls archaic
 
values and beliefs. Weaver sees it as incapable of moving us
 
toward belief and actioh, even once that dialectic has been
 
socially adjudicated. Dialectic from both perspectives is
 
humanistically impotent, incapable of securing belief or
 
engaging the passions and therefore incapable of moving us
 
to action. In this regard. Weaver quotes from Mortimer
 
Adler, who notes that dialectic
 
is a kind of thinking which satisfies these two
 
values; in the essential iriconclusiveness of its
 
process, it avoids ever resting in belief, or in the
 
assertion of a truth; through its utter restriction
 
to the universe of discourse and its disregard for
 
whatever reference discourse may have toward
 
actuality, it is barren of any practical issue. It
 
can make no difference in the way of conduct, C^h^
 
Ethics of Rhetoric;, 28; from by Mortimer
 
Adler, 243-44)
 
Grassi and Weaver—and Adler as well—see the problem
 
sympathetically but from different directions. Prom both
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points of view, however, the metaphorical, figurative nature­
of rhetorical language is affirmed, seen as necessary to
 
grasp and enliven those truths that will move the person
 
beyond logical cohviction to the here-dnd-now realm of
 
belief and action. Moreover, both men hold that knowledge
 
is based on belief, as did Afistotler that there is no true
 
knowledge without it, but rather merely idle speculation.
 
To Grassi, knowiedge is derived philosophically by adhering
 
to and proceeding from prerational principles or archaic
 
ideas, and in this he claims authority in Aristotle (see
 
ghgpQric as Philosophv 26t-7); To Weaver, knowledge is
 
secured as it relates to our pursuit of the good, and in
 
this he claims authority in Plato (see
 
Rhetoric, Chapter I, "The Phaedrus and the Ethics of
 
Rhetoric"). Grassi the Aristotelian who finds his
 
intellectual sustenance in the world view of 16th-century
 
Italian Humanism and Weaver the Platonist who
 
philosophically positions himself with the world view of the
 
Age of Faith obviously part company on many issues. But
 
as regards rhetoric being metaphorical, they see eye-to-eye,
 
if from different perches. And in this respect they are
 
consistent with and provide a contemporary endprsement of
 
the classical tradition.
 
If that tradition has lost out along the way—and in
 
some respects it certainly has—it is attributable as much
 
as anything to the scientistic point of view discussed
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previously, the view that would have knowledge, and
 
therefore language, istripped of its emotive content and made
 
purely logical* This is the knowledge and:tho wduld be
 
rhetoric of Cartesian rationalism (granted>sh overworked
 
phrase), wherein language is stripped of it analogic,
 
figurative, metaphorical content and made instead literal,
 
denotive, and demonstrative. It is the language of
 
information and facts. Susan Miller provides a brief
 
description of how humanistic rhetoric lost out to this
 
rationalistic, scientific perspective.
 
It takes little philosophical training to recognize,
 
however, that rhetorical humanism, the view that
 
unites language, thought, and action in the person,
 
lost out to self-reflective rationalism, the
 
separation of subject from object. The
 
contextuality of rhetoric could not hold sway
 
against objective, scientific, and ultimately
 
positivistic thought. ("Classical Practice and
 
Contemporary Basics," 50)
 
"The contextuality of rhetoric" is a well-chosen phrase
 
and, not incidentally, a good metaphor. It brings us up to
 
Miller's meaning. More to the point is her description of
 
the situation we find ourselves in. In an age awed by the
 
scientific and everything that claims, often bogusly,
 
affiliation with it, metaphorical language finds itself
 
somewhat cornered or, because it's been so often abused,
 
disparaged. Yet it is one of those elements of rhetoric
 
that is both consistent with the classical tradition, the
 
humanistic tradition, and pertihent to the contemporary
 
experience, because it does not -depend on th prevalence of
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this or that world view but on the essentially unchanging
 
makeup of human nature. AS well, it is the only language
 
that can adapt to changing circumstances, finding its
 
meaning in the application of principles to reality. It is
 
the only language that can express and enlighten the person
 
existentially, concretely, and, in a phrase Grassi might
 
have used, in the fully human realm.
 
It has often been pointed out that the very persons
 
Grassi and Weaver lay claim to were themselves leery of
 
18 ' " '
 
emotive language; and, in a way, they were. But they were
 
critical of exclusively emotive language, language
 
dissociated from reason, and they were critical, as we all
 
should be, of emotive language being used exploitively. At
 
the same time, both Aristotie and Plato recognized rhetoric
 
as leading to right judgement in regard to the good, and
 
that right judgement was a function of the whole person,
 
Aristotle repeatedly points out that for persons to be
 
persuaded^—for them to choose the right course of action and
 
to subscribe to the belief necessary for that^-they must be
 
affectively disposed to both recognize the probable truth of
 
an argument and to act upon that conviction. And Plato,
 
for all his criticism of the emotional side of our nature,
 
composes all his philosophical writings metaphorically, from
 
the p^public to the, ph^e;drus. Without metaphor, which
 
includes allegory, he would have been practically
 
speechless. The problem is not emotive language but rather
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 the separation of emotive language from its dialectical
 
counterpart. As Richard Weaver points out, "The kind of
 
rhetoric which is justly condemned is utterance in support
 
of a position before that position has been adjudicated with
 
reference to the whole universe of discourse—and such the
 
world always produces more than enough" {^]jS_££l3lc5_2f
 
"BhSiaiiSf 25).
 
Rhetoric without dialectic produces the kind of
 
exploitive or platitudinous discourse that has given
 
rhetoric a bad name. It too separates logos from pathos,
 
but it errs in the other direction from purely denotive
 
discourse by using emotional appeals to manipulate the
 
audience. Political rhetoric is often used as an example of
 
this. Yet political rhetoric at its best, from Burke to
 
Lincoln to Churchill, is metaphorical. And without metaphor
 
we would be hard put to conceptualize our political
 
circumstances, and we would be unable to grasp those
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sustaining mythologies that make political life possible.
 
The significance of metaphor is contingent on an
 
accompanying dialectic. We can rhetorically enliven only
 
what we can rationally adjudicate. The metaphorical
 
eloquence of Lincoln, for example, which is what mostly
 
survives in our recall, was built on an axiomatic
 
foundation, a dialectical spine. Strictly emotive rhetoric
 
is invertebrate; the metaphors dissipate into thin air.
 
Additionally, much modern rhetoric, abetted by not a small
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amount of misled rhetorical theory, would have metaphor as a
 
mere embellishment of otherwise purely denotive language,
 
leaving one nebulous and the other sterile. This is
 
rhatoric as garnish or decoration^eloquence in the worst
 
sense of the word. The ghost-written speeches of
 
contemporary political figures readily come to mind as
 
instances of preconceived polemic polished up with
 
negotiable metaphors—cliches really~~not to convey or
 
vivify the discourse but to popularize the speaker.
 
Metaphor is conjoined with rhetoric which is conjoined
 
with dialectic. And one could extend the figure, adding res
 
and verba, matter and form, the person and the world, the
 
immanent and the transcendent, and so on. The organic
 
conceptualization of language, of the person, and of the
 
world has always been at the heart of humanism, whatever its
 
various manifestations or emphasis. That humanism subsumes
 
the accidental distinctions between ancient and modern, and
 
it supervenes the rationalism of our age by reminding us—
 
metaphorically more often than not—that as creatures of our
 
history we share common lot with creature of all history.
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chapter VII
 
Rhetoric is Ethical
 
Language, any language, is fraught with value. This is
 
true even of that language that purports to be value-free.
 
All the more is it true of rhetoric, that language that
 
seeks to persuade and move people toward belief and action.
 
And this is so because rhetoric necessarily entails an
 
opposition of principles. And, as Richard Weaver reminds
 
us, rhetoric, unlike dialectic or purely rational discourse,
 
"always espouses one of the contraries"
 
Rhetoric. 21). It brings analysis to bear on prudential
 
conduct. It solicits choices, and in doing that it
 
unavoidably assumes a hierarchy of values. It says that
 
this choice is better than that one, this course of action
 
or this belief better than that one. Even though it deals
 
in the probable and contingent—indeed, because it deals in
 
the probable and contingent—it seeks to move us toward what
 
is good and true. It is, therefore, ethical. This was a
 
virtually unquestioned assumption of classical rhetoric, and
 
that assumption has only been seriously questioned very late
 
in our history, in the trail of various forms of nihilism
 
that would have all values up for grabs or that would
 
confine them, incommunicado, to the precinct of individual
 
consciousness.
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I assume here that the act of rhetoric, the fact that
 
one engages in it at all, presumes the ability to
 
communicate with others and presumes accordingly the ability
 
to influence others, one way or another, sooner or later,
 
toward good or evil. I assume these things because to
 
assume otherwise would be to lapse into absurdity. And I
 
maintain, in conjunction with our rhetorical traditions,
 
that if language does not move us, or seek to move us,
 
toward the good and true, then it is not rhetoric at all.
 
One of the best articulations of this position I have
 
seen is by a relatively obscure 19th-century rhetorician,
 
Franz Theremin. And for this I am indebted exclusively to
 
Nan Johnson's fine article, "Three Nineteenth=Century
 
Rhetoricians: The Humanist Alternative to Rhetoric as
 
Skills Management." Unfortunately, as Nan Johnson points
 
out, Franz Theremin's writings are practically unobtainable,
 
coming to us in an 1844 translation of his
 
Virtue, copies of which^ according to Johnson, can now be
 
found only in a few East Coast libraries.
 
Explaining Theremin's perspective, Johnson writes as
 
follows:
 
Three concepts underlie Theremin's theory of
 
rhetorical discourse: 1) that persuasion is a
 
communicative act essential to harmonious living, 2)
 
that audience identification and assent to commonly
 
shared values is the most effective moral basis for
 
persuasion, and 3) that a consideration of values on
 
the part of the speaker will generate both thought
 
and appealing subject matter. (107)
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In the same place she writes;
 
Theremin contends that all motivation and truth, and
 
hence all persuasion, stem from the pursuit of
 
ethical ideas of duty, virtue and happiness. He
 
defines rhetoric as "that action, that force, that
 
develops this universal ethical impulse. (107)
 
With minor adjustments, perhaps no adjustments at all,
 
those comments could have been Aristotle's over 2000 years
 
earlier, who saw rhetoric and ethics as integrated endeavors
 
leading the person toward right conduct.21 And compare them
 
with Richard Weaver's contention, coming over a century
 
later than Theremin, when he writes, as quoted earlier, that
 
rhetoric "is impulse, not simply cognition, and finally
 
one's interest in rhetoric depends on how much poignancy one
 
senses in existence."
 
"Theremin," Johnson writes, "describes the rhetorical
 
dialogue as an 'attempt to transfer something that has been
 
generated in the depths of the soul into another person,
 
which can only be done in proportion as the orator himself
 
possesses that which is to be produced' (Johnson 108;
 
Theremin 152). This is strikingly similar to the over
 
arching theme of Plato's Phaedrus. where Socrates sees one
 
good soul sympathetically leading another good soul to the
 
love Of the truth. In that comment as well are clear
 
reflections of Quintillian's admonition that the rhetorician
 
must be a good person, "Blameless in point of character"
 
(Johnson, "Ethos and the Aims of Rhetoric," p. 103), for
 
only then can he expect to lead the other person to good
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action. In it also are reflections of Augustine in Qn
 
Christian Doctrine and of Hugh Blair in the century before
 
Theremin. "Let him (the rhetorician) so order his life that
 
he not only prepares a reward for himself/"Augustine
 
writes, "but also so he offers an example to others, and his
 
way of living may be/ as it were, an eloquent speech"
 
(quoted by Johnson in "Ethos and the Aims of Rhetoric,"
 
107). "It is of utmost consequence," Hugh Blair writes,
 
"that the speaker firmly believe both the truth and
 
importance of those principles which he inculcates in
 
others, and not only that he believe them speculatively but
 
have a lively and serious feeling for them" (Johnson 109).
 
Theremin's conception of an ethical rhetoric is like a
 
summation of the whole classical tradition; and since he
 
situates rhetoric in the life and destiny of the person, he
 
summarizes the whole humanistic tradition as well. "Ethical
 
ideas are destined to be embodied in life,"he writes, "they
 
lie in the reason, and must be presupposed to be in every
 
man considered as being endowed with reason, and are,
 
moreover, actually indwelling in everyone" (Johnson, "Three
 
Nineteenth-Century Rhetoricians," 115). And in our time,
 
Richard Weaver, situated in the same traditions, can write,
 
"Thus, in the reality of his existence, man is impelled from
 
behind by the life-affirming sentiment and drawn forward by
 
some conception of what he should be" (Ideas Have
 
20).
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This is rhetoric in pursuit of ethical goals and
 
propagated by ethical persons. Both aspects are contained
 
in the classical idea of ethos. And that ethos is based on
 
the nature of the person, defining the person as one with an
 
innate idea of and disposition toward the good. This
 
concept is at the core of Judeo-Christian teaching. To
 
Theremin, as to practically everyone in the classical
 
tradition, rhetoric facilitates our best realization of
 
ourselves, both individually and socially. In the sense
 
that language, the Word, is inseparable from ideation and
 
the making of our lives, rhetoric is the best realization of
 
ourselves. Rhetoric is, therefore, the most humanistic of
 
the arts~~not a social skill or a way of verbally managing
 
the difficulties inherent in our social existence. In the
 
classical tradition, rhetoric has a distinctly teleological,
 
22 ' ■ ■if not theological, dimension. Its ethical character
 
derives from a conceptualization of ultimates. But/ as
 
Richard Weaver writes in Ideas_Have— / "An ethics
 
of rhetoric requires that ultimate terms be ultimate in some
 
rational sense" (23). It Is the modern world's disability
 
or disinclination to define ultimate terms in spirte rational
 
sense on which hinges much of the difference, real or
 
supposed, between classical and modern rhetoric,
 
particularly in regard to rhetQi^ic's ethical dimension.
 
The reasons for what I will call our ethical
 
disenfranchisement are many and vast. They are represented
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from one perspective by the previously quoted observation of
 
S* Michael Halloran that, "Deprived of a given world, the
 
modern author is likewise deprived of a given rhetoric."
 
This represents the prevalent supposition—prevalent at
 
least in academic and intellectual quarters—that the world
 
of classical rhetoric had benefit of an intelligible
 
universe that prbvided firm grounds for ethical discovery,
 
and that we don't. From a different perspective, it is the
 
result of that world view that is grouped rather loosely and
 
imprecisely under the umbrella term of modern rationalism.
 
That term is a sort of philosophical thumbnail sketch of the
 
modern penchant for accepting as true oniy that which can be
 
proven rationally, which means empirically/ inductively,
 
and—and the word should perhaps go in quotations—
 
scientifically. This perception is often implicit in the
 
academic use of the word "scholarship." Thusly reduced,
 
cognition, and hence ethical subscription, are rendered
 
hostage to the sensate and the material, to provable
 
phenomena. Provable phenomena being necessarily particular
 
and not universal-'-which is the unavoidable reductionism
 
posed by nominalism—ethics becomes necessarily situational,
 
an ad hoc response to circumstances, not the issue of
 
principles. At the risk of further over-simplifying a
 
complex subject, a third major perspective that has
 
confounded the postclassical formulation of an ethical
 
rhetoric, and related to the other two, is that of epistemic
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subjectivism. This perspective presents itself in many
 
guises, many -isms, some mentioned previously here, but it
 
is basically just one form or another of phenomenology, the
 
epistemic theory that would have all reality the end-product
 
of personal perception. Reality is in the eye of the
 
beholder—or in the ear, or in the cognition, and so forth.
 
As a philosophical theory, it's as old as rhetoric itself,
 
many Sophists having subscribed to it, for example, but it
 
has enjoyed a resurrected status in recent years, at least
 
among some academics. It has notably ingratiated itself
 
into rhetoric via cognitive psychology, reader-response
 
criticism, and the various fashionable speculations of
 
European, mostly French, intellectuals that are referred to
 
rather niftily by Marilyn Cooper as "nouvelle French
 
notions,"
 
The upshot of all this for rhetoric, among countless
 
Other ramifications, is that many moderns find themselves
 
ethically (and morally) invalid, unable to formulate a
 
rhetoric of ethics because they are unable to formulate
 
ultimates, to build a hierarchy of values upon which to base
 
an ethics. Ethics is predication, after all, and
 
predication becomes free-floating, not derived
 
situationally, as is often wrongly supposed, but dictated
 
situationally, Thus is relativism always its own
 
prescriptiveness. As a result, our attempts to formulate a
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postclassical rhetorical ethics have been in the main
 
piecemeal, fatuous, or illusory.
 
One attempt to circumvent the ethical problems posed by
 
the above-mentioned modern perspectives is so-called
 
Rogerian ethics, a borrowing from the theories of the
 
psychotherapist Carl Rogers whose social influence was
 
considerable in the 1960's and early 1970's. in their text
 
Rhetoric, Discovery and Change, Young, Becker, and Pike
 
subscribe rather enthusiastically to Rogerian ethics (274),
 
And so does Maxine Hairston ("Carl Roger's Alternative to
 
Traditional Rhetoric," 373-377), Yet however admirable its
 
altruism, Rogerian ethics is merely a formula for getting
 
along, a sort of rhetorical bedside manner that would have
 
the rhetorician be respectful and considerate of the point
 
of view of those he is trying to convince of something.23
 
There is nothing wrong with that, and as a rhetorical
 
procedure it is similar to Aristotle's idea that we should
 
base our arguments on the beliefs of our audience and be
 
respectful of "reputable opinions" (Barnes 16; and Lunsford,
 
"Aristotelian vs, Rogerian Argument: A Reassessment," 149),
 
But two objections at least come to mind. If, as Rogers and
 
his advocates say, we should be considerate of those we are
 
trying to convince, the next insistent question is, why?
 
Why should we be fair to those we are trying to convince if
 
not being fair would work just as well, or better? Ethics
 
always entails a hierarchical series of "whys?" And
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Rogerian ethics are applicable to any form of rhetoric for
 
any reason, winning over an audience by accommodating it,
 
which is what Rogerian ethics easily becomes, is, as a
 
tactic, standard stuff for demagogues. It was stock-in­
trade for some (not all) of the Sophists, it was routine for
 
Machiavelli, and it has long been elementary to political
 
diplomacy, of good nations and bad.
 
Rogerian ethics exemplify the modern ethical dilemma.
 
People still have the urge, the impulse for goodness, but
 
are confounded by various debilities of relativism when it
 
comes to determining just how that goodness is to be judged
 
'■ ■ 24 ■ ' 
or why it ought be adhered to. 
There have been many attempts to formulate an ethics 
for post-classical or "new" rhetoric. To S. Michael 
Halloran in "On Making Choices, Sartorial and Rhetorical," 
it is a matter of propriety and appropriateness. Alan 
Chaffee, in "The Ghostly Paradigm in Composition," appeals 
to what he calls the "toto principle," by which he means 
that we should be CQmpletely fair with those we address by 
presenting all the information at our disposal, favorable to 
us or otherwise. He doesn't elaborate as to why we should. 
In effect, he says that we should be rhetorically fair 
because it's the fair thing to do. Even the admirable Chaim 
Perelman finds himself confounded by the same probiem; how 
to posit an objective ethics on a subjective, relativistic 
foundation. He tries to solve the problem by establishing 
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an objective foundation in human universals, in the manner
 
of Kant's "categorical imperative" and Rousseau"s "general
 
will." The objective benchmark for Perelman would be the
 
"universal audiencer" a mental concept of the rhetorician
 
comprising all reasonable, intellectually competent people
 
(Ray 364), If the argument persuades—wins the "adherence"
 
of—the universal audience, then that result secures a kind
 
of operational objectivity, thus solving for Perelman, if
 
imperfectly, the dilemma between relativism oh the one side
 
and absolutism or transcendent objectivity on the other.
 
The universal audience becomes his non-empirical grounding
 
for ethical judgements.
 
A danger in assessing the ethical and valnative
 
confusions of contemporary rhetoric lies in supposing that
 
academic and intellectual deliberations of that problems are
 
normative, that they are somehow representative of the
 
majority thinking of our age. Although it would be
 
impossible to prove one way or the other, I suggest that
 
such deliberations are not representative, that they are,
 
rather, simply more visible, or audible, as the case may be*
 
There are reasons to suppose—talking with people being one
 
of them-^—that despite the much heralded pluralism and
 
confusions of our age that most people still subscribe to
 
some form of transcendent reality, that to most people the
 
real, in Richard Weaver's words, "is not exhausted by the
 
apparent."
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In an event, ethics are finally a function of each
 
person's conceptualization or grasp of his or her human
 
circumstances, of how he or she visualizes and chooses to
 
understand life, society, and human destiny. In this
 
respect, rhetoric, and particularly the ethics attendant to
 
it, is not as much subject to the prevalence of this or that
 
theory or -ism as is sometimes supposed. Since, at its
 
best, it draws both suasion and sustenance from those it
 
addresses—and the sometimes arbitrary bifurcation between
 
classical and contemporary rhetoric hasn't changed that—its
 
appeal and powers to persuade depend not on a given world
 
but on a given humanity. One of the faults of postclassical
 
theorizes of rhetorical ethics is that they seemingly feel
 
compelled to establish a universal ground for ethics before
 
addressing an audience ethically, forgetting that their
 
uncertainties—or need fpg certainties—are not necessarily
 
shared by the majority of humankind. They tend to forget
 
that rhetoric, when incorporated with an audience can
 
discover principles that detached cerebration never can.
 
Rogerian ethics tells us what we already know and have
 
known; and Perelman, however admirably, seeks a non-

empirical grounding for value judgements that the majority
 
of us have always possessed, not through a mental concept of
 
a universal audience but by means of the reality of a
 
universal conscience. Even unsophisticated human nature is
 
ethically adept, no less or more so now than it has ever
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been. We continue to ask a hierarchical series of "whys?"
 
because, as Pranz Theremin observed, and as most of the
 
great persons of history have received as an obvious truth,
 
"Ethical ideas are destined to be embodied in life, they lie
 
in the reason, and must be presupposed to be in every man
 
considered as being ehdowed with reason, and are, moreoverv
 
actually indwelling in everyone." To those who would ask
 
why, on whah basis, things are right and wrong, one can
 
answer finally and in the fullness of wisdom, "Because."
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Chapter VIII
 
Conclusion
 
In 1961, two years after the publication of Roots gpi: a
 
New Rhetoric, in which Daniel Fogerty advocates a new
 
rhetoric for our age, one based on the theories of, among
 
others, I. A. Richards, Kenneth Burke, and S. I. Hayakawa,
 
John Kennedy gave his Inaugural Address. It was acclaimed
 
worldwide. One might suppose that John Kennedy had found a
 
new rhetoric for our age. Only it was as much old rhetoric
 
as new, informed by traditional guidelines and brought to
 
bear on current problems. Commenting on President Kennedy's
 
address, the editors of The New Yorker praised him for his
 
return to and revival of the classical style of Aristotle
 
and the "grand" style of Cicero. The New Yorker concluded
 
its comments by saying, "And so we leave the speech to the
 
students of rhetoric, having invoked for Mr. Kennedy the
 
blessings of Aristotle and Cicero, and for ourself the hope
 
that he has re-established the tradition of political
 
eloquence."25

At the same time that The New Yorker was expressing the
 
hope that Kennedy's Inaugural Address signaled the re­
establishment of the tradition of classical rhetoric,
 
advocates of the new rhetoric were telling us that the
 
classical tradition was no longer pertinent to the modern
 
experience, that its modes, perspectives, and underlying
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world view were outdated and irrelevant. That position was
 
taken by Fogerty in 1959. Somewhat l^ter, in 1970, shortly
 
after Maftin Luther King yji-, had borrowed from the classical
 
tradition even more than John Kennedy, and with the help of
 
that tradition discovered a moral consehsus where none was
 
thought to exist. Young, Seeker, and Pike, in Rhetorict
 
Discovery and Change, wrote, "Mth few exceptions, the
 
classical tradition survives today only in the training of
 
formal debaters" (5). The modern position is spelled out
 
most clearly, and the classical tradition dismissed almost
 
out-of-hand, by Knoblauch and Brannon in 1984 in Rhetorical
 
Traditions and the Teaching of Writing, where the classical
 
tradition is referred to pejoratively as "That Old-Time
 
Religion" (22).
 
Yet while these and other advocates of the new rhetoric
 
are saying that modern rhetoric will bring about better
 
communication, and that now, as opposed to before,
 
"enlightened cooperation is the preeminent goal of
 
communication" (Young et al. 9), Winston Weathers is
 
describing the pathos of modern communication (The Broken
 
World). Wayne Booth is observing the amorality of much
 
modern literature IThe Rhetoric of Fiction 377-398), Richard
 
Weaver is decrying the decline of rhetoric (The Ethics of
 
Fhsforic), and some of the most prominent rhetoric scholars
 
of our time are making a strong case for the relevance of
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the classical tradition
 
Obviously, contemporary rhetoric is a vexed subject,
 
and as its various and sundry definitions would indicate, a
 
confused one. A principal reason for this, besides the
 
scientism discussed above and what James Kinneavy calls "the
 
alienation of rhetoric from the humanities" (20), is the
 
epistemic perspective or theory that would have language the
 
maker and determiner of reality and knowledge. It is partly
 
premise to the work of Young et al. and extensively so to
 
that of Knoblauch and Brannon, whose work I take to be
 
representative of the perspective. The theory I speak of
 
has it that the individual, with language, symbolically
 
composes the world. From this point of view, knowledge is
 
not something existing objective to the person or something
 
fixed; it is, rather, ever-shifting, renewing, and being
 
formed individually, and verified socially. The phrase
 
"making knowledge," for example, has worked its way into the
 
literature of contemporary rhetorical theory and its related
 
field, composition studies; and now that phrase is often
 
taken for granted, even though by making knowledge a product
 
of subjective determination it represents a veritable
 
revolution in the history of Western thought, which for the
 
most part was based on a realist epistemology. A common
 
expression among new rhetoric theorists, and something of a
 
favorite concept with post-structuralist literary theorists.
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is that language is subversive: since it is able to compose
 
reality, it can subvert whatever has been accepted as real
 
or true. But, of course, if that theory were true (which
 
would mean that it itself wduld be subject to subversion and
 
therefore only tentatively true), then everything else may
 
or may not be true, including accepted principles of
 
conduct, institutions and their informing principles, and
 
those very reasoning processes by which we arrive at
 
probable truths (or real ones) that are premise to
 
individual and social decisions.
 
Again taking Knoblauch and Brannon as representative of
 
this perspective (not especially pages 51-76), it is not
 
surprising that they aren't just advocating a particular
 
rhetoric, or scoring another kind of rhetoric with which
 
they don't agree; they are attempting to articulate an
 
entire philosophy and ask the teachers of contemporary
 
writing and rhetoric to subscribe to that philosophy
 
preliminary to formulating pedagogical theory and practice
 
(98-117). As well, they set themselves up as authorities on
 
classical thought, and on the basis of that, on what John
 
Gage finds to be a superficial, often wrong understanding of
 
classical thought ("The 2000-Year Old Straw Man"), they try
 
to make the case that the Greeks and Romans and everyone
 
sympathetic to or imitative of the classical perspective
 
since then were, in the main, unenlightened. In one place
 
they write, "We speak of the superiority of modern rhetoric
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only with reference to its imptoved rhetorical integration
 
of evidence and insight regarding the processes of the mind,
 
the operation of discourse, and the nature of knowledge"
 
(77). That "only" doesn't leave much else. And again the
 
question arises as to the superiority of modern rhetoric.
 
If this modern epistemic perspective does in fact represent
 
some kind of new enlightenment, where are the rhetorical
 
fruits of it?
 
Generally, the modern perspective referred to here'has
 
served only to create a dichotomy between contemporary
 
rhetoric and the classical tradition. More accurately, it
 
has served to create a dichotomy between contemporary theory
 
and classical rhetoric, since there is no evidence that some
 
new kind of rhetoric is upon us or that the classical
 
tradition is obsolete. And, as a rule, the advocates of the
 
modern perspective are less philosophical about their
 
contentions than are Knoblauch and Brannon (and in this
 
respect, I would credit Knoblauch and Brannon for spelling
 
out what they mean and why, instead of simply making
 
statements whose philosophical implications are left
 
unexamined). The position is more often simply asserted.
 
The current jargon in composition studies, for example.
 
That would have writing as a "process" and not a "product"
 
is fraught with philosophical implications that are almost
 
always taken for granted, never spelled out. One of the few
 
places where I have seen these implications spelled out.
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although not to my agroementr is in Knobiauch and Brannon's
 
(chapter
 
S, "Discourse as Knowledge/Knowledge as Discourse," 51-75)^
 
Instead of using "process" and "product" as mere jargon,
 
they put their philosophical cards on the table. Mostly,
 
however> the contentions of the new rhetoric, epistemic and
 
other, are simply asserted. So what one is used to seeing
 
is something like S. Michael Halloran, in "On the End of
 
Rhetoric, Classical and Modern," saying, "The assumptions
 
about knowledge and the world that informed classical
 
rhetoric are no longer tenable" (624) or "In the absence of
 
a world given by a stable and coherent cultural tradition,
 
man is compelled to construct his own" (625). This is the
 
manner in which the problem, the dichotomy between classical
 
and modern rhetoric, is usually stated, as an assertion that
 
the world of classical rhetoric was predictable, composed of
 
fixed, objective values, and culturally stable, whereas, in
 
Halloran's words, "Our values seem arbitrary, contradictory,
 
and ultimately groundless" (624).
 
It's beyond my purposes herSf and I daresay beyond my
 
ability, to go into a full-scale analysis of the
 
philosophical presumptions and ramifications of this
 
modernist perspective. The narrower point is that this
 
perspective—which is both philosophical and just plain
 
modern, i.e., since we live now we know more than those who
 
lived then—'has driven a wedge between classical and
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contemporary rhetoric, made them two schools of thought as
 
opposed to one tradition, and, in my judgement, to the
 
discoverable benefit of no one. My argument is that the
 
rhetorical tradition is still intact and that the supposed
 
differences between ancient and modern rhetoric are more
 
specious than real, more concocted than demonstrable, if not
 
in theory at least in practice; and I adhere to the position
 
that rhetoric is a practical, living art, not a theoretical
 
one,
 
I'll use an analogy here, which will have the weakness
 
of all analogies, and the strengths. The history of art has
 
seen more changes in perspective than one could count,
 
including some radical shifts in epistemic perspective.
 
Such shifts characterize and enliven the history of art, and
 
one only has to think of the more obvious examples: the
 
change from the Romanesque to the Gothic perspective in the
 
middle ages, the advent of Impressionism in the middle of
 
the nineteenth century, the marked disjuncture from
 
tradition that distinguished modern art in the first part of
 
the twentieth century. All these shifts in artistic
 
perspective entailed corresponding shifts in philosophical
 
perspective. There was a different philosophical premise to
 
the architecture of Alberti in the late fifteenth century
 
and Frank Lloyd Wright in the twentieth, Rembrandt and
 
Piccasso could not have had much more different world views.
 
The examples could go On, Yet no informed and judicious
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student of art history would argue that a Byzantine mosaic
 
of the tenth century and a Mexican mural of the twentieth
 
weren't sharing in the same art, thht they weren't part of
 
the same unbroken tradition, or that one was artistically
 
superior to the other. All art has the same basal
 
vocabulary, some of it emphasized one time in one way, some
 
of it another time in another way.
 
So too with rhetoric. Despite its different
 
perspectives over the centuries—and, as George Kennedy
 
reminds us in Classical Rhetoric# there have been many of
 
them—the basal vocabulary is the same, as is the subject
 
and the task. The five descriptive qualities of rhetoric I
 
have put forth here (and there could have been others, and
 
they could have been framed differently) are qualities I
 
conceive of as prescinding from shifts in philosophical
 
perspective, emphases of style, or changes in theory. I
 
visualize them as qualities characteristic of the rhetoric
 
of every age. Different philosophical worlds
 
notwithstanding, rhetoric deals in the real world, and its
 
appeal and form in the face of human realities has been
 
essentially the same, across time and across cultures, from
 
Plato to Augustine, Lincoln to Hammarskjold, Jefferson to
 
Kenyata, and all in between. Just as artists find affinity
 
with other artists and other art, whatever the gulfs that
 
separate them, so do rhetoricians imitate and join with
 
other rhetoric. They speak or write from the same
 
82
 
tradition, visualize the same audienoe, and seek the same
 
goals, Lincoln, at his best, spoke for the ages because he
 
spoke from the ages. All good rhetoric does this. Indeed,
 
the language it employs derives meaning and resonance it
 
would not have were it not for the tradition. Rhetoric
 
recognizes society's historical dimension; and while it
 
addresses the person in time, it recognizes him or her as
 
persons like unto and fulfilling the story of all others,
 
But it is only the whole person who shares in this
 
historical affinity. Like art, rhetoric achieves validity
 
in accordance with the universality of its appeal, but it
 
achieves that universality by addressing the person in time,
 
place, and particularity. In doing this, it presumes, as it
 
has always presumed, that dialogue is possible, that shared
 
ideas and shared values are possible. Even those I have
 
criticized in this paper understand that, and their
 
scholarship confirms it. Publishing is in itself an act of
 
extraordinary faith in our ability to understand ourselves
 
and the other person,
 
I have for practical purposes used throughout a narrow
 
conceptualization of rhetoric, having focused on public
 
utterances, written or spoken, that are in response to
 
pressing social and human issues. It is a somewhat
 
arbitrary conceptualization, adopted for the expedient
 
purpose of managing an unmanageable subject. Rhetoric is
 
much broader than that, of course, and in a real way it can
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include virtually any kind of cominunication, albeit, not
 
just for any reason. Yet even in its public, social
 
manifestations it can take on many forms and still achieve
 
and be characterized by the qualities I have elaborated on*
 
Rhetoric doesn't have to be an Inaugural Address, although
 
without Lincoln's use of that unique form, both rhetoric and
 
we would be the poorer. "
 
We, the audience, take bur rhetoric where we find it.
 
It can emanate from Tin Pan Alley or from a Birmingham jail.
 
In World War II it was a scene from Shakespeare, when the
 
British government commissioned the movie production of
 
Henry V, and Henry's speech before the Battle of Agincourt
 
became a rallying cry for the Battle of Britain. It can be,
 
and often is, just one word, "Freedom!" Or it can be
 
wordless, and thereby say everything, as when in September,
 
1939, Radio Warsaw played Chopin's "Polonaise" over and over
 
again until Poland finally fell. It can become and remain
 
part of a sustaining national mythology—chiseled perhaps,
 
like the words of Emma Lazzarus, telling us more than they
 
say, or sung, like the lyrics of "America," splendid even
 
without the music. There is little difference ultimately as
 
to the form it takes. And it can always be understood,
 
whether it be an eighteenth-century painting by Francisco
 
Goya figuratively denouncing the cruelties of tyranny or a
 
twentieth-century crayon drawing by a child from Treblinka
 
exposing the face of evil with the timeless voice of
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innocence. It can be all these things, and more, because
 
finally rhetoric is not what is said, or how, but what is
 
heard. And in this respect its voice is neither ancient nor
 
modern. It is, rather, magnificently or tragically, merely^
 
-yet never merely—-human.
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: Notes­
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
Weathers quotes James Conant's observation that as a
 
result of modern science "the very concept of existence
 
becomes meaningless."
 
For two different perspectives on the confused state of
 
affairs in classical Greece, see Lunsford and Ede,
 
"On distinctions Between Classical and Modern Rhetoric,"
 
p. 43, for a brief commentary, and E, R. Dodds,
 
Ancient Concept of Progress, passim, for an extended
 
commentary.
 
"Men desire by nature," wrote Aristotle, "to discover the
 
truth. Nature would not have given men such a desire and
 
left it impossible of satisfaction." Quoted by Barnes,
 
p. 16, without the original citation in Aristotle.
 
For the point of view that great rhetoric requires a
 
great audience, wee Weaver's The Ethics of Rhetoric.
 
Chapter VI: "Milton's Heroic Prose."
 
Quoted by Gage from W. Ross Winterowd, The Contemporary
 
2nd ed. (New York:
 
Harcout Brace Javanovitch, 1981), p. 20.
 
For as concise an articulation as I have found of the
 
modern epistemic perspective referred to here, see
 
Chapter 3, "Discourse as Knowledge/Knowledge as
 
Discourse," in
 
Writing, by C. H. Knoblauch and Lil Brannon, pp. 51-76.
 
For a good example of contemporary rhetoric that depends
 
for its appeal on the solicitation of shared beliefs, and
 
for an explication of that rhetoric, see Keith Miller's
 
article on the rhetoric of Martin Luther King Jr.,
 
"Martin Luther King, Jr. Borrows a Revolution: Argument,
 
Audience, and implications of a Secondhand Universe."
 
It is instructive how in times of social or political
 
crisis—war being the ultimate example—-our equivocations
 
about shared meanings and principles fall largely by the
 
wayside. By no accident has much good rhetoric been the
 
product of political emergency, not just because of the
 
magnitude of the events or the perceived threat to our
 
interests, but because the commonplace beliefs of the
 
people are readily accessible to the rhetorician.
 
Churchill in World War II comes to mind; and it is
 
interesting to note that once the war had ended and those
 
commonplace beliefs were less accessible, Churchill's
 
rhetoric was not so well received.
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For an elaboration of the concept of the linguistic
 
"speech community" ah<3 it transposition into written
 
discourse, see "RhetoricVs 'Audience and Linguistics'
 
'Speech Community': Implications for Understanding
 
Writing, Reading, and Text^" by Martin Nystrand, in
 
Written DiscQurse, ed, Martin Nystrand, pp. 1-24,
 
10 See Maxine Hairston's "The Winds of Change: Thomas Kuhn
 
and the Revolution in the Teaching of Writing," College
 
£sa}P2SitiSD_3Bd-£;3miDi3riiS3ii2U (February 1982), pp. 76-87,
 
for an example of how Kuhn's theory has been
 
enthusiastically adopted by one member of the Composition
 
studies community.
 
11 For an excellent retort to those who would apply Kuhn's
 
theories to the language arts, see Robert J, Connors's
 
"Composition Studies and Science." College English 45
 
(January 1983), pp, 1-20, And for a thorough retort to
 
Kuhn's theories as they are meant to apply to just the
 
physical sciences, see Criticism and the Growth of
 
Knowledge, passim,
 
12 Margaret Mean, Edward Teller, Christian Barnard, and
 
Benjamin Spock,
 
13 Perelman, like Aristotle, bases his theories on a
 
comprehensive survey of that rhetoric has been in
 
actuality, not on mere speculation. And he is led to
 
conclude that rhetoric has never been purely logical,
 
In this respect, Richard Vatz, in responding to Lloyd
 
Bitzer's theory of the "rhetorical situation," is correct
 
in maintaining that the rhetorician can shape events. He
 
errs, I believe, in going too far and maintaining that
 
the rhetorician creates the situation, just as Bitzer
 
errs, I think, in maintaining that the situation creates
 
the rhetoric, Scott Consigny strikes a happy medium
 
between the two, giving the rhetorician, the audience,
 
and the situation their just due,
 
15
 
Grassi's conception of humanism is particularly that of
 
the Italian Renaissance, For a collateral view of this
 
perspective, see Rainer Weiss's "The Humanist Rediscovery
 
of Rhetoric as Philosophy: Giovanni Giovano Pontano's
 
Aegidus." Philosophy and Rhetoric 13 (Winter 1980), pp,
 
25-39, For a precis of Grassi's indebtedness to
 
Giambattista Vico and the Italian Humanist tradition, see
 
Chapter 6, "Ernesto Grassi." in Contemporary Perspectives
 
oq Rhetoric, by Sonja K. Foss et al., p. 125.
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16 For a concise statement of Grassi's position on the
 
relationship between rhetoric and dialectic, see Rhetoric
 
and Philosophy," in Phijosophy and Rhetoric 9 (1976), pp.
 
201-216.
 
17 I borrow the term "scientistic," which is admittedly
 
slightly pejorative, from Robert Connors in "Composition
 
Studies and Science."
 
18
 
As Barnes points out, one of Aristotle's main claims in
 
the Gryjjps was that rhetoric should not excite the
 
passions^(20); and in the Republic, the Gorqias. and -­
although by way of a mixed message—in the Phaedrus.
 
Plato raises the same caution.
 
19 See C. Lyle Johnstone's "An Aristotelian Trilogy:
 
Ethics, Rhetoric, Politics, and the Search for Moral
 
Truth," Philosophy and Rhetoric 13 (Winter) 1980),
 
pp. 1-17.
 
20 For a good analysis of the use of metaphor in politics,
 
see Eugene Miller's "Metaphor and Political Knowledge,"
 
T]3S_^^Xl^Ii_Polliis3l_S£i^rj£S_ESYlsa 73 (1979), pp.
 
155-169.
 
21
 
See note 19.
 
22 For a discussion of classical rhetoric's theological
 
character, see Weiss, "The Humanist Rediscovery of
 
Rhetoric as Philosophy," p. 32.
 
23 Andrea Lunsford provides a Rogerian-like criticism of
 
Rogerian ethics from the clasisical perspective in
 
"Aristotelian vs. Rogerian Argument: A Reassessment,"
 
3o (May 2979),
 
pp. 146-151.
 
24 For an example of how Rogerian ethics can devolve into
 
ersatz homiletics, see Jim Coirder's "Argument as
 
Emergence, Rhetoric as LOve, Rhetoric Review 4
 
(September 1985), pp. 16-32. ;
 
25 For the Inaugural Address of John Kennedy and the
 
editorial from The Mew Yorker. I am indebted to Edward P.
 
j. Corbett's Tiaas udjilir
 
pp. 551-55. Mr. Corbett provides a detailed analysis of
 
the speech on pp. 555-65, wherein he notes its classical
 
elements and style, its similarity to the diction of the
 
Bible, the speeches of Lincoln, and so forth.
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For an analysis of the modern epistemic perspective
 
underlying the work of Young, BecKerV and Pike,^^^ o
 
Knoblauch and Brannpn, and also of Ann Berthoff, see
 
J?imes Berlin's "Contemporary Composition: The Major
 
pedagogical Theories>" College English 44 (December)
 
1982), pp, 765-77.
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